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  1 
CORRECTING CORPORATE BENEFIT: 
HOW TO FIX SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
BY SHIFTING THE DOCTRINE ON FEES 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH* 
Abstract: The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can 
discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts 
have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—
under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-
holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of 
both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently en-
acted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. 
The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three 
specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in 
shareholder litigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Delaware may at last be on the verge of fixing shareholder litigation. 
Spurred by the surprise 2014 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in ATP 
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,1 the de facto national corporate law-maker 
has launched a thorough examination into fee-shifting in intra-corporate litiga-
tion.2 The current controversy over fee-shifting is an outgrowth of a larger cri-
sis in shareholder litigation. And, just as matters of substance and procedure 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, Sean J. Griffith. All rights reserved. 
 * T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Jack Coffee, How-
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 1 See 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014). 
 2 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (“The aggregated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations 
have resulted in a convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto national corpo-
rate law.”) More than half of all public companies and over sixty percent of the Fortune 500 are incorpo-
rated in Delaware. See Why Businesses Choose Delaware, STATE OF DEL. DIV. OF CORP., http://
corplaw.delaware.gov/eng/why_delaware.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/L59P-KRQS (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2014). Delaware law is the basis of the corporate law curriculum in law schools across the U.S. 
and is widely followed by the courts of other states. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 
IND. L.J. 1345, 1398–99 (2012) (“Delaware law is a central part of the business law curriculum in most 
major U.S. law schools . . . . Courts in other states often cite and follow Delaware case law when their 
own case law is sparse.”). 
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are inextricably interlinked, any examination into fee-shifting must also probe 
these deeper concerns. Delaware’s inquiry into fee-shifting thus presents a 
unique opportunity to reevaluate the current system of shareholder litigation 
and to launch appropriate reforms. 
The defects of shareholder litigation have long been known.3 Basically, 
the problem is one of too much and not enough: too much in the way of filings, 
and not enough consideration at settlement.4 In terms of filings, virtually every 
merger transaction is challenged, and derivative suits attend every corporate 
crisis, frequently following in the wake of prosecutorial or regulatory interven-
tions.5 The vast majority of these claims settle, an outcome that is not unusual 
for civil litigation. What is striking, however, is the predominance of non-
pecuniary relief. The vast majority of shareholder litigation settles for no mon-
etary recovery to the shareholder class.6 Why? Because non-pecuniary relief 
nevertheless entitles plaintiffs’ counsel to recover their fees from the corporate 
defendant under the “corporate benefit” doctrine.7 The application of this doc-
trine has led to the result that in shareholder litigation, the corporate defendant 
always pays fees and expenses for both sides. Defense counsel, for their part, 
have reconciled themselves to this result by bargaining, in exchange, for a 
broad release of claims at settlement, immunizing their clients from any and all 
claims related to the underlying facts, including theories and claims never as-
serted by the plaintiffs.8 Having struck this Faustian bargain, attorneys now 
churn a mass of filings and settlements, the ultimate result of which is over-
compensation of attorneys (on both sides) and systematic under-compensation 
of the plaintiff class. 
The opportunity to do something about this situation arose suddenly, in 
late spring 2014, in a surprise decision of the Delaware Supreme Court. In ATP 
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme Court held as a 
matter of law that Delaware corporations can adopt bylaws to shift attorneys’ 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. Fitzgerald, 51 N.E. 997, 999 (N.Y. 1898) (noting the risk that a share-
holder plaintiff might be bought out, thereby leading to undercompensation of the class interest). 
 4 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Ac-
quisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 153 (2004) (identifying frequent filings and 
low value settlements as key indicia of litigation agency costs). 
 5 See infra notes 59–104 and accompanying text (discussing merger litigation); infra notes 37–58 
and accompanying text (examining derivative litigation). 
 6 See Jill E. Fisch & Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors) (supplying statistics on settlements of 
merger litigation); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1802–04 (2010) (supplying statistics on settlements of derivative 
litigation). 
 7 See infra notes 105–137 and accompanying text (studying the role of the corporate benefit doc-
trine); infra notes 195–252 and accompanying text (exploring its doctrinal origins). 
 8 See infra notes 88–104 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation release). 
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fees and litigation costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation.9 
Delaware corporations, in other words, can use bylaw amendments to enact the 
English (“loser pays”) Rule for shareholder suits.10 
Because most shareholder plaintiffs sue in a representative capacity, fee-
shifting would have an especially pronounced effect on shareholder suits. Cur-
rent fee-shifting proposals would force the representative litigant, suing on 
behalf of the corporation or the class, individually to bear the corporation’s full 
cost of defending the suit.11 The individual litigant’s upside, meanwhile, would 
remain limited to a proportional share of the recovery. By imposing the full 
downside risk on a litigant whose upside must be shared proportionally with 
the class, fee-shifting makes the bringing of representative shareholder actions 
economically irrational, even in cases involving potentially significant recover-
ies.12 
The bar, understanding the threat posed by fee-shifting to shareholder liti-
gation, reacted immediately.13 In the space of two weeks, the Delaware Bar 
                                                                                                                           
 9 91 A.3d at 560. The bylaw provision provided that claimants were obligated to pay “all fees, 
costs, and expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attor-
neys’ fees and other litigation expenses)” of the opposing party in the event that the claimant “does 
not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full rem-
edy sought.” Id. at 556. 
 10 The question in ATP Tour concerned a Delaware non-stock corporation, not a stock corpora-
tion. Id. at 557. This, however, is likely a distinction without a difference. See Herbert F. Kozlov & 
Lawrence J. Reina, Delaware Supreme Court Approves Fee-Shifting Bylaw for Non-Stock Corpora-
tions, BUS. L. TODAY, June 2014, at 1, 1 (emphasizing that “the court’s decision in ATP Tour relies on 
and refers to other provisions in the Delaware General Corporation Law . . . and cases involving by-
laws adopted by ‘regular’ stock corporations”). Perhaps more significantly, ATP Tour involved a 
closely held, member-managed organization, not a diffusely-held public corporation. For further dis-
cussion of this distinction, see infra notes 146–165 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 143–194 and accompanying text. Some fee-shifting provisions also seek to 
impose costs on the lawyers bringing the claims on behalf of the representative plaintiff with similar 
results. See infra notes 143–194 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text; see also Motion to Invalidate Retroactive Fee-
Shifting and Surety Bylaw or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss and Withdraw Counsel at 8–9, Kastis v. 
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., No. 8657-CB (Del. Ch., July 21, 2014) (“Plaintiffs and their counsel 
cannot pursue . . . claims if they will be at risk for hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in 
Defendants’ litigation costs. By enacting this draconian Bylaw, the Board imposed a risk that [no] 
economically rational stockholder or lawyer, could accept.”). 
 13 Plaintiffs’ lawyers decried the “potentially devastating impact on shareholders’ rights” and 
quipped that the court’s endorsement of the English Rule had “caused Delaware to secede from the 
union.” Liz Hoffman, Shareholder Suits May Prove Costly: Ruling Upholds Bylaw Requiring Loser to 
Pay Winner’s Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4052702304908304579565850165670972, archived at https://perma.cc/27FD-34NQ?type=pdf (quot-
ing Randall Baron); Tom Hals, Delaware Upholds Fee-shifting Bylaw, Could Upend Class Actions, 
REUTERS, May 9, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/delaware-courts-fees-idUSL2N0N
V1PK20140509, archived at http://perma.cc/8F78-PF6B (quoting prominent shareholder attorney 
Stuart Grant). The defense-side reaction was generally muted. Stephen F. Arcano et al., Fee-Shifting 
Bylaws: The Current State of Play, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (June 20, 2014), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/fee-shifting-bylaws-current-state-play, archived at https://perma.
4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1 
Association proposed an amendment to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law to restore the status quo ante.14 The amendment proposed a per se ban on 
fee-shifting, barring corporations, whether by bylaw or charter, from imposing 
liabilities on shareholders.15 The proposed amendment was formally intro-
duced into the Delaware State Senate on June 3, 2014, with every expectation 
that it would pass by the end of the legislative session and be effective as of 
August 1, 2014.16 After significant corporate lobbying,17 however, the legisla-
tive process was halted by a resolution calling for “continued examination” 
into the issue.18 
Because the policy issues underlying fee-shifting cannot be understood 
without taking into account current patterns and practices in shareholder litiga-
                                                                                                                           
cc/8ZGN-CLAA (“[T]here is a significant risk that adoption of fee-shifting bylaws . . . could generate 
a meaningful adverse reaction from, among others, governance advocates, proxy advisory firms and 
some stockholders.”); Theodore Mirvis et al., With a Note of Caution, Delaware Rules Fee-Shifting 
Bylaws Facially Permissible, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (May 21, 2014), http://www.wlrk.
com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.23341.14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
Q7Y8-R6ZQ (“We believe caution is in order . . . . [I]n the public company context [there is] an in-
herent tension between the goal of deterring litigation and the danger of self-interested director action 
. . . .”). However, some firms did advertise fee-shifting as a tool their clients ought to consider. Ronald 
O. Mueller & Jason J. Mendro, The Supreme Court of Delaware Upholds Fee-Shifting Bylaws as 
Facially Valid, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER (May 13, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/Supreme-Court-of-Delaware-Upholds-Fee-Shifting-Bylaws-as-Facially-Valid.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U6RF-MRSQ (noting that the opinion “may give Delaware corpora-
tions an important tool to discourage meritless shareholder litigation”); WSGR ALERT: Delaware 
Supreme Court Endorses “Fee-Shifting” Bylaw in Certified Question of Law, WILSON, SONSINI, 
GOODRICH & ROSATI 2 (May 12, 2014), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=
publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-fee-shifting.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/2CFF-LXBL (stating 
that “boards of directors of private and public Delaware corporations should seriously consider adopt-
ing fee-shifting bylaws of their own”). 
 14 S.B. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014) (noting that the amendment “is intended 
to limit applicability of [ATP Tour] to non-stock corporations”).  
 15 See S.B. 236 § 331 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, neither the certificate 
of incorporation nor the bylaws of any corporation may impose monetary liability . . . on any stock-
holder of the corporation . . . .”). 
 16 S.B. 236 (contemplating an August 1 effective date); see Daniel Fisher, Is Delaware Law a Favor 
to Plaintiff Lawyers, or Shareholder Protection?, FORBES (June 10, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2014/06/10/is-delaware-law-a-favor-to-plaintiff-lawyers-or-protection-for-capitalists/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/D6K8-LXRF (describing path of Senate Bill 236 through the Delaware legisla-
ture, including that S.B. 236 was “drafted with near-unanimous approval by the members of the Council 
and Senate sponsors”). 
 17 See, e.g., Letter from C. Michael Carter, President & Chief Operating Officer, Dole Food Co., 
Inc., to Bryan Townsend, Senator, Del. Gen. Assembly (June 9, 2014) (on file with author); Letter 
from Lisa A. Rickard, President, Inst. for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Members of 
the Del. Gen. Assembly (June 9, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from Andrew Wynne, Dir. of State 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Bryan Townsend, Senator, Del. Senate (June 5, 
2014) (on file with author). 
 18 S.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014), (calling upon “the Delaware State 
Bar Association, its Corporation Law Section, and the Council of that Section . . . to continue its on-
going examination of the State’s business entity laws with an eye toward maintaining balance, effi-
ciency, fairness and predictability”). 
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tion, Delaware’s inquiry into what to do about fee-shifting cannot proceed 
without also addressing the chronic problems in this area. Indeed, the question 
begged by fee-shifting in all of its forms—whether and how allocation of cost 
ought to be used to control the flow of litigation—begs the question of whether 
shareholders ought to be encouraged to sue or whether and in what situations 
shareholder suits ought to be discouraged.19 This, in turn, depends upon the 
public policy goals of shareholder litigation and how well (or poorly) the cur-
rent system achieves them. As a result, Delaware’s “continued examination” is 
not and cannot be of fee-shifting alone. Rather, policy-makers must evaluate 
the system of shareholder litigation as a whole in order to understand what, if 
anything, ought to be done. 
This Article offers guidance in that project. Its aims are threefold. First, 
Part I offers a comprehensive overview of current practices in shareholder liti-
gation, detailing its typical patterns and probing underlying problems.20 This 
analysis reveals courts’ current application of the corporate benefit doctrine as 
the principal enabler of the systemic overcompensation of lawyers and under-
compensation of plaintiffs. Next, Part II of the Article argues that fee-shifting 
bylaws, as they have so far been proposed, cannot fix what is fundamentally 
wrong with shareholder litigation because they target effects (excessive litiga-
tion) rather than the cause (misapplication of the corporate benefit doctrine).21 
As a result, they overreach, discouraging potentially valuable shareholder 
claims and failing to achieve the policy goals of shareholder litigation. Finally, 
this Article seeks to refocus the debate on the real cause of the present crisis in 
shareholder litigation. Part III demonstrates how misapplication of corporate 
benefit has transformed the principle of fee-sharing into a doctrine of fee-
shifting.22 And Part IV provides a concrete set of policy recommendations that 
target the fundamental cause—that is, the unconstrained generosity of current 
interpretations of the corporate benefit doctrine.23 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Avery Wiener Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee-Shifting, in PROCEDURAL LAW & ECO-
NOMICS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 271, 303 (Chris William Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 
2012). 
[R]ules of cost allocation feed back through the selection of cases to influence the de-
velopment of other areas of substantive and procedural law. Rules that encourage par-
ties to raise relatively innovative claims and defenses help to break down precedent, 
while rules that penalize risk-taking and novel arguments help to preserve traditional 
formal categories. Given the pervasive influence of ostensibly procedural rules on sub-
stantive outcomes, it may not be possible to separate the policy of fee-shifting from 
deeper questions of what the law ought to be. 
Id. at 303. 
 20 See infra notes 24–142 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 143–194 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 195–252 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 253–311 and accompanying text. 
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The reforms ultimately urged by this Article can been seen as a kind of 
fee-shifting, not to the English Rule, but rather back to the American Rule, 
where each side finances its own litigation costs, and away from the current 
Delaware Rule, under which the corporation always pays. Specifically, this 
Article recommends: (1) that corporate benefit no longer be recognized as a 
basis for awarding attorneys’ fees in non-derivative suits; (2) that the burden 
for establishing causation of the benefit be shifted to plaintiffs in certain cases; 
and (3) that the scope of the litigation release received by defendants in con-
nection with settlement be proportional to the value recovered for the plaintiff 
class. Although each of these proposed rules must be put into operation by 
courts, legislative action may be needed to define the contours of the rules and 
to determine the limits of judicial discretion. The current moment provides the 
ideal opportunity to consider these reforms. 
I. PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Shareholder litigation is intra-corporate litigation brought by sharehold-
ers, typically alleging a breach of fiduciary duties on the part of the board.24 
Individual shareholders may bring suits on their own.25 Except in the case of 
activist investors, however, they rarely do.26 Instead, most shareholder litiga-
tion is representative litigation, brought by a single shareholder or group of 
shareholders on behalf of an interest common to all.27 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers, here, as in other contexts, typically bring representa-
tive actions under contingency fee arrangements. Lawyers find their clients 
either by maintaining long-term relationships with institutional investors or by 
actively soliciting smaller investors.28 Having found their client, the lawyers 
                                                                                                                           
 24 This definition excludes private securities law cases, especially 10b-5 class actions, which can 
be understood as a form of shareholder litigation. It also excludes all other actions that might be 
brought against a corporation (e.g., employment, environmental, or products liability claims) that do 
not principally involve investor protection or shareholder rights. 
 25 Thus, appraisal claims as well as takeover cases involving frustrated bidders, may be under-
stood as forms of shareholder litigation, but they are excluded from this Article because they lack the 
“litigation agency costs” that are the subject of the analysis here. See, e.g., Minor Myers & Charles R. 
Korsmo, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015) (showing that appraisal actions have fewer indicia of litigation agency costs than fidu-
ciary duty suits). 
 26 For reasons why individual actions have not proliferated, see infra notes 246–248 and accom-
panying text. 
 27 Formally, the shareholder claimant represents a class interest of shareholders, in the case of a 
class action, and the interest of the corporation itself in the case of a derivative suit. See infra notes 
37–58 and accompanying text (discussing derivative suits); infra notes 59–104 and accompanying text 
(examining class actions). 
 28 Nicholas Politan, Mediating Securities Class Actions: A View from the Captain’s Quarters, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOC., 4th Quarter, 2005, at 1. For an example of a plaintiffs’ firm solic-
iting individual clients, see Family Dollar Stores, Inc., FARUQI & FARUQI, http://www.faruqilaw.com/
2015] Correcting Corporate Benefit 7 
are more or less fully in control of the litigation.29 Non-institutional investors 
with diffuse shareholdings are rationally indifferent to the conduct of the litiga-
tion,30 and institutional investors, once thought to be the solution to the prob-
lem, have likewise shown themselves to be inconsistent monitors of sharehold-
er litigation.31 This results in the familiar problem of “litigation agency costs,” 
where the attorney conducts (and concludes) the litigation in ways that may 
depart from plaintiff interests.32 
None of that, however, is especially unique to shareholder litigation. 
What is unique is the tendency of shareholder litigation to settle for non-
pecuniary relief. In order to understand how and why this occurs, it is neces-
sary to descend into the details of typical filing and settlement patterns. That is 
the work of the sections that follow. Sections A33 and B34 outline the paradig-
matic forms of representative shareholder litigation—the derivative suit and 
the merger class action—discussing common claims under each. The aim of 
these sections is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of substantive corpo-
rate law, but rather to provide enough detail concerning each claim that pat-
terns begin to emerge. After describing typical claims and settlement patterns, 
Section C then analyzes the judicial role in review and approval of settle-
ment.35 It is here that the causal role of the corporate benefit doctrine begins to 
                                                                                                                           
FDO, archived at http://perma.cc/SV6T-PPQL (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (soliciting clients for a 
class action involving the sale of Family Dollar Stores). 
 29 As described by a prominent mediator of securities class actions: 
[T]he mediator would ask the plaintiff’s lawyer to go out in the hall and speak to the 
client about a proposed offer. Perplexed, the plaintiff’s lawyer would respond, “I don’t 
have a client here.” “Well then,” the mediator would respond, “why don’t you go to the 
restroom, look in a mirror, talk to yourself, and come back here and tell me whether 
you want to accept the settlement or not.” 
Politan, supra note 28, at 1. 
 30 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389–94 (1986) (discussing phenomenon where 
each shareholder’s stake in the corporation is too small to justify the cost in terms of time and atten-
tion of actively engaging in corporate affairs). 
 31 Compare Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Insti-
tutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2121 
(1995) (discussing promise of institutional lead plaintiffs), with David H. Webber, Private Policing of 
Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional 
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 934–35 (2014) (reporting results of empirical 
study of different types of institutional lead plaintiff). 
 32 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder 
Litigation, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23 (1985) (demonstrating the problem); Randall S. Thomas 
& Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 152, 154 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) 
(summarizing recent empirical work on the scope of the problem and noting that “representative liti-
gation introduces factors that can put daylight between the interests of lawyers and investors”). 
 33 See infra notes 37–58 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 59–104 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 105–137 and accompanying text. 
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emerge. Section D closes this Part by highlighting the public policy challenge 
posed by shareholder litigation in its present state.36 
A. Derivative Suits 
The derivative suit is the original form of representative action in the cor-
porate context.37 It is a suit brought by the shareholder on behalf of the corpo-
ration, which is to say the corporation is in fact the plaintiff, urged into action 
by the shareholder complainant.38 As described in an old opinion of the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery: 
A bill filed by stockholders in their derivative right therefore has 
two phases—one is the equivalent of a suit to compel the corpora-
tion to sue, and the other is the suit by the corporation, asserted by 
the stockholders in its behalf, against those liable to it. The former 
belongs to the complaining stockholders; the latter to the corpora-
tion. The complaining stockholders are allowed in derivative bills to 
bring forward these two causes of action in one suit. But any recov-
ery granted by the decree necessarily is in favor of the corporation. 
The complaining stockholders secure nothing to themselves as indi-
viduals, beyond the mere right, which is inherent in the decree for 
relief to the corporation, of compelling their recalcitrant corporation 
to accept the relief which the decree affords.39 
Traditional derivative suits involve a loss to the corporation resulting from the 
bad acts of its directors or managers.40 Shareholders must use the derivative 
suit to force the corporation to recover these losses because the corporation’s 
managers are the wrong-doers and therefore not eager to bring claims against 
themselves.41 Any recovery the shareholders win, however, is a recovery of the 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See infra notes 138–142 and accompanying text. 
 37 The form is old and, some argue, obsolete. GEOFFREY MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, 
RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 365 (2014) (referring to the derivative suit as a “platypus”). 
 38 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The nature of the action is two-fold. First, 
it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by 
the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.”). 
 39 Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1932). 
 40 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (“A shareholder derivative suit is a uniquely 
equitable remedy in which a shareholder asserts on behalf of a corporation a claim belonging not to 
the shareholder, but to the corporation.”). 
 41 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (“[T]he purpose of the derivative 
action [is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means to protect the interest of the 
corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and mangers’” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949))); accord Taormina v. 
Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 475 (Del.Ch.1951) (“[W]henever a corporation possesses a cause of 
action which it . . . refuses to assert . . . equity will permit a stockholder to sue in his own name for the 
2015] Correcting Corporate Benefit 9 
corporation, paid into the treasury, confirming the notion that the corporation is 
in fact the plaintiff.42 
Although the rubric for determining whether a claim is derivative or di-
rect is easy to state—asking simply who suffered the harm and who received 
the benefit43—it is not always easy to apply.44 Moreover, the same set of facts 
may give rise to both types of claims.45 Nevertheless, claims involving voting 
or undercompensation in the purchase or cancellation of a shareholder’s shares 
are understood as paradigmatic direct claims, basic rights that shareholders 
possess individually.46 Most claims involving mergers and acquisitions, there-
fore, are non-derivative in nature.47 Claims alleging waste, meanwhile, are 
paradigmatic derivative suits.48 
Studies of current patterns in derivative litigation reveal that derivative 
suits frequently are filed in federal court, often by repeat play law firms on 
behalf of shareholders with insignificant ownership stakes.49 Derivative suits 
                                                                                                                           
benefit of the corporation solely for the purpose of preventing injustice when it is apparent that the 
corporation’s rights would not be protected otherwise.”). 
 42 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) (“In a derivative suit, the corporation is the functional plaintiff—
the real party in interest . . . . Any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the corporation. As a 
result, shareholders . . . do not receive any direct financial benefit.”). 
 43 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (stating that 
the standard “must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the 
corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any 
recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)”). 
 44 See, e.g., Abelow v. Symonds, 156 A.2d 416, 420 (Del. Ch. 1959) (“The line of distinction 
between derivative suits and those brought for the enforcement of personal rights asserted on behalf of 
a class of stockholders is often a narrow one. . . .”). Courts occasionally have struggled, for example, 
with claims involving the issuance of stock for inadequate compensation, which directly harms the 
corporation but also dilutes its shareholders. See, e.g., In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holders Litig., 
906 A.2d 808, 818–19 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[When a] board of directors authorizes the issuance of stock 
for no or grossly inadequate consideration, the corporation is directly injured and shareholders are 
injured derivatively . . . . [M]ere claims of dilution, without more, cannot convert a claim traditionally 
understood as derivative, into a direct one.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
 45 See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99–100 (Del. 2006) (describing “a species of corpo-
rate overpayment . . . that Delaware case law recognizes as being both derivative and direct in charac-
ter.”); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Del. 1996) (claim alleging excessive compensation 
derivative but board abdication direct). 
 46 Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1277 (Del. 2007) (holding shareholders’ claim to be direct 
“because the Recapitalization constituted an expropriation of voting power and economic value from 
[the Company’s] public stockholders, and a transfer of that voting power and economic value to [the 
defendants]”). 
 47 See generally Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4 (distinguishing between derivative suits and 
merger class actions and finding that merger class actions dominate derivative filings in Delaware for 
the period under study). For further discussion of merger litigation, see infra notes 59–104 and ac-
companying text. 
 48 See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 2 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.10 (2006) (“Claims of waste will always be derivative 
claims. . . .”). 
 49 Erickson, supra note 6, at 1754–68. 
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follow fast upon corporate mishaps and often are filed in the wake of securities 
fraud class actions or enforcement actions by regulators or prosecutors and 
mimic allegations made in the prior action.50 Claims of this type therefore have 
been labeled “tag-along” derivative suits.51 The settlement of these claims typ-
ically focuses on non-pecuniary relief—changes to corporate governance pro-
visions or corporate compliance programs to prevent the particular mishap 
from recurring, sometimes referred to as corporate “therapeutics.”52 Substan-
tial monetary recovery is uncommon.53 The plaintiffs’ lawyers, nevertheless, 
are entitled to recover their fees from the defendant corporation on the basis of 
the settlement’s therapeutic benefit. 
Derivative suits have, over their long history, developed an assortment of 
procedural obstacles to prevent abuse.54 These include the continuous owner-
ship requirement,55 the posting of bonds,56 the demand requirement,57 and the 
formation of special litigation committees.58 The shareholder class action, by 
contrast, need satisfy none of these legal hurdles. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 49, 80 (2011). 
 51 TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 23 (2010) (noting the 
“‘tagalong derivative suit’ that is likely to be filed in the wake of the 10b-5 claim”). For a current 
example of such a suit, see In re Walmart Stores, Inc. Del. Derivative Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 7455-
CS (Del. Ch. July 24, 2012) (alleging harm from failures of corporate governance and compliance that 
also led to a massive federal FCPA investigation). The same phenomenon is occasionally referred to 
as “coattail” litigation. See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, 
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1, 5 (2000). 
 52 George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The “Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956). 
 53 Erickson, supra note 6, at 1802–03 (finding “meaningful financial benefit” in two out of every 
101 “classic derivative suits” in her sample). 
 54 See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder’s Derivative Suits, 42 
COLUM. L. REV. 574, 574 (1942) (providing recommendations to the New York Law Revision Com-
mission concerning procedural reforms in derivative suits in response to perceived abuses of the 
form). 
 55 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2014). For forceful criticism of the “comporaneous ownership” 
aspect of § 327, see generally J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Re-
quirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673 (2008) (advocating that § 327 should require only that derivative 
plaintiffs hold stock at the time of lawsuit and that they not voluntarily divest during the lawsuit). 
 56 See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York, 
32 CAL. L. REV. 123, 123 (1944) (discussing the passage of the New York state bond posting re-
quirement for derivative suits and questioning its constitutionality). There is no bond posting require-
ment in Delaware. 
 57 DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (requiring that the plaintiff “allege with particularity the efforts, if any, 
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors . . . or the grounds for not mak-
ing the effort”). The demand requirement can be seen as much as an outgrowth of the corporate 
form—the board directs the corporation, including in the decision to sue—as a means of mitigating 
abuse. 
 58 See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical 
Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1320 (2009) (studying the current operation of special litigation 
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B. Merger Class Actions 
Shareholders dissatisfied with board conduct in the context of a merger 
transaction may bring their complaint in the form of a class action, rather than a 
derivative suit.59 Recently, mergers have become a magnet for low-value share-
holder suits.60 Currently, in the United States, over ninety-seven percent of deals 
attract at least one shareholder claim, and many attract several such claims filed 
in multiple jurisdictions.61 Whether these filings result in monetary relief for the 
plaintiff class depends strongly on the nature of the allegations. If the underlying 
transaction involves a deal with a controlling shareholder, the claim likely will 
result in monetary relief.62 If, by contrast, the underlying transaction is a third 
party merger, it almost certainly will not.63 As the following sections demon-
strate, however, even when the claim results in monetary relief, it is far from 
clear that such relief is in fact a product of the plaintiffs’ efforts. 
1. Controlling Shareholder Deals 
Controlling shareholder merger litigation raises traditional conflict of in-
terest issues.64 In these cases a shareholder exercising voting control over the 
                                                                                                                           
committees and finding that committees pursue claims ten percent of the time, settle thirty percent of 
the time, and seek dismissal sixty percent of the time). 
 59 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 168 (reporting the results of a multiyear study of 
Delaware chancery court litigation finding that “[a]lmost all (94 percent: 772 of 824) class action suits 
arise in an acquisition setting whereas almost all (90 percent: 123 of 137) of the derivative suits arise 
in a non-acquisition setting”). The reference to “shareholders” here and throughout this Article is to 
shareholders of the acquired corporation. Shareholders of the acquiring company may be dissatisfied 
as well, but because their status as shareholders is fundamentally unchanged by the transaction, any 
claims they may possess against their board are likely to be insubstantial. Such claims will be deriva-
tive in nature—the fundamental injury, overcompensating the target, is derivative of the acquiring 
corporation’s—and will face the substantive hurdle of the business judgment rule, as opposed to the 
heightened substantive standards afforded to target shareholders. 
 60 It has not always been so. For example, in 2007, only fifty-three percent of mergers attracted 
shareholder claims. Recent Developments in Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 2 (2012), http://www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/Shareholder_MandA_
Litigation-pdf.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/M4EA-F8VV?type=source. 
 61 Matthew D. Cain & Stephen M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1 (Ohio State Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper Series No. 236, (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2377001, archived at https://perma.cc/U33H-VAA7?type=source (finding an average of seven sepa-
rate lawsuits filed in each case). 
 62 Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 5). 
 63 Id. 
 64 This can be understood as a conflict of interest on the part of the acquiring corporation’s board 
that has been appointed by the controller and is therefore likely to be conflicted between the control-
ler’s interest (as buyer) to pay as little as possible for the corporation and the minority shareholders’ 
interest (as sellers) to maximize the price paid for their shares. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (“Classic examples of director self-interest in a business transaction in-
volve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal bene-
fit from a transaction not received by the shareholders generally.” (citations omitted)). 
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corporation forces minority shareholders into a transaction resulting in the 
termination of their shareholding interest. Because control over the vote effec-
tively allows the controlling shareholder to dictate terms to the minority, Del-
aware law applies the exacting “entire fairness” standard of review to scruti-
nize these transactions.65 
In response to this heightened standard of judicial review, merging com-
panies invariably appoint an independent committee of the board to negotiate 
with the controller.66 Although the amount of deference courts are willing to 
give a special negotiating committee recently has evolved,67 it remains ex-
tremely difficult for defendant corporations to prevail in controlling sharehold-
er cases on the motion to dismiss or even summary judgment.68 This combina-
tion of a difficult substantive standard and a procedural inability to avoid dis-
covery creates a strong incentive for defendants to settle these cases.69 
Settlement of controlling shareholder cases follows a formalistic, highly 
ritualized pattern referred to as a “minuet,” or alternatively, a “Kabuki 
dance.”70 The process starts when the special committee begins to negotiate 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing and fair 
price in non-arm’s length transactions). 
 66 This is as much a function of the conflict facing the board, an obvious response to which is the 
formation of an independent committee, as it is an attempt to win judicial deference described below. 
Cf. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709–10 n.7. 
 67 If the transaction is structured as a two-step tender offer followed by short form merger, the 
involvement of the special committee in negotiating the tender offer will be an important factor in 
shifting the standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule. See In re Siliconix, 
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (applying the 
business judgment rule rather than entire fairness to the Section 253 merger portion of a two-step 
transaction with other procedural protections, including a special committee and majority of minority 
condition). If the transaction is not structured as a two-step, the involvement of a special committee 
will at least function to shift the burden of proof of fairness from the board to the plaintiffs challeng-
ing the transaction. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) 
(“[P]olicy . . . mandates careful judicial scrutiny of a special committee’s real bargaining power before 
shifting the burden of proof on the issue of entire fairness.”). The involvement of a special committee 
and a majority of minority vote may also shift the standard of review to the business judgment rule. 
See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
 68 Even when the appropriate procedural protections are used, the question whether the special 
committee functioned properly is not one that can be easily answered at the motion to dismiss stage. 
The ability to shift the burden may thus fail to entitle defendants to an early dismissal. M&F World-
wide Corp., 88 A.3d at 645 n.14. But see Swomley v. Schlect, CA No. 9355-VCL, 66–68 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 27, 2014) (granting a motion to dismiss on the basis of procedural protections and noting that 
“the whole point of encouraging [the M&F Worldwide] structure was to create a situation where de-
fendants could effectively structure a transaction so that they could obtain a pleading-stage dismissal 
against breach of fiduciary duty claims”). 
 69 In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[E]ach Lynch 
case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but because it cannot be dismissed.”). 
 70 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010) (referring to “the open-
ing steps in the Cox Communications Kabuki dance”); In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 2004 WL 1305745, at *42 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (referring to a “scripted minuet wherein [the 
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the terms of the transaction with the controller, a process that very often yields 
an increase in the merger price.71 Roughly contemporaneously, the shareholder 
plaintiffs will have sued, alleging conflict and undercompensation, and settle-
ment negotiations begin.72 As the special committee’s negotiation with the 
controller nears an end, and the ultimate merger price is finally on the table, 
defense counsel will offer to settle with plaintiffs’ counsel at that price. Be-
cause this offer entitles them to recover fees, plaintiffs’ counsel will happily 
agree.73 
In this way, the problem with controlling shareholder cases is not that they 
fail to produce monetary relief. It is that the monetary relief they produce may in 
fact have no relationship to the litigation. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentive is to 
“file early and free-ride” on the special committee’s efforts, thus replicating the 
overcompensation and undercompensation problems already identified.74 The 
free-riding lawyers are overpaid while the class interest is underserved by class 
counsel who sit back and wait to collect fees based upon the special committee’s 
efforts. The actual impact of the litigation on the ultimate outcome is willingly 
obscured by both parties in order to protect the settlement. 
2. Third-Party Mergers 
Third-party merger cases do not involve the obvious conflict of interest 
created by the presence of a controlling shareholder on the other side of the 
transaction. Shareholders therefore are not entitled to the exacting “entire fair-
ness” standard. Nevertheless, as long as the transaction invokes a fundamental 
                                                                                                                           
Committee] would bargain for a negligible price increase . . . [creating] a credible record of ‘arm’s 
length’ negotiations sufficient to survive entire fairness review.”). 
 71 This could be for either of two reasons: (1) the special negotiating committee has real negotiat-
ing power and uses it to extract price concessions from the buyer; or more cynically (2) both sides 
understand that in order to minimize liability risk, the special litigation committee must be seen to be 
“effective,” for which the increase in price can be offered as evidence. If the latter explanation is cor-
rect, of course, the controller may merely hold back a portion of its ultimate price in the initial offer, 
such that the price concession extracted by the special committee is in fact illusory. 
 72 The rough contemporaneity is possible because controlling shareholder transactions are often 
public before the merger agreement is signed. Because these transactions must be blessed by a special 
committee, they are typically announced as proposals when the special committee is formed, thus 
allowing shareholder plaintiffs to challenge the proposal and thereby become a part of the negotiation 
with the special committee. See Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d, at 620 (“Instead of suing once a controller 
actually signs up a merger agreement with a special committee of independent directors, plaintiffs sue 
as soon as there is a public announcement of the controller’s intention to propose a merger.”).  
 73 See id. at 621 (“[T]he artistry of defense counsel is to bring [both] tracks to the same destina-
tion at the same time. . . . When [the final] price is known but before there is a definitive deal, defense 
counsel . . . makes its ‘final and best offer’ to plaintiffsʹ counsel. The plaintiffsʹ counsel then accepts 
. . . .”). 
 74 See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law 
(Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2004) (documenting the phe-
nomenon). 
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“change of control” of the target company,75 shareholders benefit from the 
heightened standard of “enhanced scrutiny.”76 The shareholders’ fundamental 
complaint, in the context of third-party mergers, is that the board breached its 
fiduciary duties by adopting a flawed merger process, often due to hidden con-
flicts of interest, the ultimate result of which is inadequate consideration in the 
merger. 77 
To their process claims, shareholder litigants in third-party merger cases 
typically append complaints concerning the quality and amount of disclosure 
received in connection with the merger transaction. Although the form and 
content of merger disclosure is driven in large part by federal securities law,78 
state courts have derived disclosure duties from the statutory requirement that 
the board put the merger to a shareholder vote.79 State corporate law on merger 
disclosures now sits alongside and substantially overlaps federal proxy regula-
tion.80 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Abbreviating somewhat, a change of control transaction is generally understood to involve 
either cash or other non-stock consideration or a transaction wherein a diffusely held corporation 
comes under the sway of a controlling shareholder. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1993) (incorporating the diffuse-to-controlling shareholder aspect of the 
standard); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (first 
announcing the doctrine). 
 76 Although there is general agreement on what situations currently give rise to enhanced scruti-
ny, there is debate over how broadly it ought to be applied. Compare J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a 
Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 7 (2013) 
(criticizing the Paramount doctrine and seeking to articulate a broader basis for enhanced scrutiny), 
with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3337–38 
(2013) (disputing the extension of enhanced scrutiny into non-traditional applications). 
 77 The strongest cases identify some conflict of interest affecting board decision-making. See, 
e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1988) (management team’s 
financial interest in winning auction and its domination of the nominally independent board contami-
nated sale process); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 442 (Del. Ch. 2012) (investment 
banker conflict of interest); In re Del Monte S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL (Del. Ch., Dec. 1, 
2011) (investment banker conflict of interest); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (interest of founding family in remaining in management may have caused target to prefer 
private equity bidder). 
 78 Federal requirements derive from the Proxy Rules. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(a)–(d) (2012). 
 79 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2014) (requiring a shareholder vote on mergers); Stroud v. 
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (implying disclosure duties from the mandatory shareholder vote); 
see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary 
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (1996) (describing the development of the duty of 
disclosure under Delaware corporation law). 
 80 Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Inves-
tors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 572 (1987) (criticizing Del-
aware decisions that “moved Delaware law from a posture of requiring less disclosure than federal 
law requires to a posture of requiring more . . . .”). Innovations in Delaware disclosure duties have 
been driven by investment bankers and private equity firms. See generally Lloyd L. Drury III, Private 
Equity and the Heightened Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 33 (2010) (noting 
that state courts’ ability to alternate “between hard edged rules and fuzzy standards” enables them to 
“generate a more subtle and effective form of regulation than the federal pattern of enacting govern-
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The typical pattern of third-party merger claims is for a filing to be made 
during the pendency of the transaction, often immediately upon public an-
nouncement of the transaction, and for the entire litigation effort to take place 
between the signing and closing of the transaction. The shareholder plaintiffs 
seek equitable relief—an injunction barring consummation of the transac-
tion—and, in the meantime, expedited discovery. But Delaware courts rarely 
enjoin deals, even when plaintiffs identify a clear conflict of interest.81 Instead, 
most such cases settle, often prior to the hearing on the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction.82 Moreover, most of these are “settlement class actions,” cases 
where the settlement is negotiated prior to certification of the class and where 
the approval of the settlement and certification of the class ultimately occur in 
the same hearing.83 
In the vast majority of these settlements the only consideration received by 
plaintiffs is supplemental disclosure in the merger proxy.84 The rest involve 
some amendment to the merger agreement, typically the deal protection terms, 
such as a reduction in the termination fee or the extension of a go-shop or win-
dow-shop period.85 Pecuniary relief is vanishingly rare.86 Nevertheless, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are entitled to have their fees paid by the defendant corpora-
tion in recognition of the benefit created by the supplemental disclosures. On 
                                                                                                                           
ance mandates”); Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair Summary: Delaware’s Frame-
work for Disclosing Fairness Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 881 (2008) (describing the role investment 
bankers play in in disclosure duties between directors and shareholders). 
 81 See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp., 41 A.3d at 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although a reasonable mind 
might debate the tactical choices made by the El Paso Board, these choices would provide little basis 
for enjoining a third-party merger approved by a board overwhelmingly comprised of independent 
directors, many of whom have substantial industry experience.”). The most likely situation for injunc-
tive relief involves the presence of an intervening bidder. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 82 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 60 (“Of the 190 unique settlements we identified, 
180 were reached before the merger closed. Most of these were reached shortly before a hearing on 
the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction . . . or shortly before the shareholder vote. The medi-
an time between lawsuit filing and settlement in this sample was forty-four days.”); Fisch et al., supra 
note 6 (manuscript at 8) (citing studies that found “that nearly 70% of merger cases settle, while the 
rest are dismissed”). 
 83 See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
951, 957–62 (2014) (arguing that these actions involve class counsel selling something they don’t 
own); Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 858, 900 (1995) (distinguishing settlement class actions from ordinary settlements on the basis 
of “proxies” for negotiation and the substitution of “gross judicial fiat” for contractual agreement). 
 84 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 61, at 16 (“Settlements which only require disclosure constitute 
55.1% of the settlement types in the sample and are the most common type of settlement.”); Robert 
M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions, CORNER-
STONE RESEARCH 6 (Feb. 2013), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-
a8fc-4ec4182dedd6/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/9MZP-3496?type=pdf (in 81% of merger cases filed in 2012, the only product of the settlement 
was additional disclosure). 
 85 Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 15–16). 
 86 Id. 
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average, plaintiffs’ attorneys are awarded fees in the range of $350,000–
$700,000 for the settlement of such cases. 87 In exchange for paying the lawyers, 
defendants receive a broad litigation release, described in greater detail below. 
3. Litigation Release and Claim Preclusion 
The defense side to the settlement bargain is the release of claims. De-
fendants are willing to concede corporate benefit and pay attorneys’ fees in 
exchange for a release from the plaintiffs’ claims. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that the litigation release received by defendants in this context does 
not apply only to claims brought by plaintiffs in the present litigation. It also 
applies to any and all claims arising from the same underlying facts. This is so 
regardless of whether alternative legal theories arising from the same underly-
ing facts actually were or even could have been raised by plaintiffs in the pre-
sent action.88 Moreover, once approved by a state court, settlements extinguish 
the ability of shareholders to litigate related claims in any U.S. court.89 Preclu-
sion of subsequent claims is a source of considerable value to defendants.90 
They therefore seek to maximize its scope by drafting the broadest possible 
litigation releases. 
Defendants typically insist upon and receive releases extending to “all 
possible claims, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, arising out of or 
relating to the events that were the subject of the litigation.”91 To give the re-
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. (“In disclosure-only settlements, the average fee award has declined over the past several 
years, from an average of $730,000 in 2009 to an average of $540,000 in 2012. Studies show that the 
average fee awarded in disclosure settlements in Delaware is approximately $500,000.”). 
 88 Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1106 (Del. 1989) (“[A] court may permit the 
release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled 
class action even though the claim was not presented and might not even [have] been presentable in 
the class action.”). 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (further illuminat-
ing the Full Faith and Credit demand); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 
399 (1996) (holding that a Delaware settlement was entitled to full faith and credit and precluded 
federal court plaintiffs from continuing their lawsuit unless they could show a due process violation in 
the suit that settled first). See generally Pyott v. Louisiana Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 380, 
2013 WL 1364695 (Del. Apr. 4, 2013) (dismissing suit filed in Delaware based on California court’s 
prior dismissal of derivative action with prejudice). 
 90 Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1058 (2013) (“The preclusive effect of settlement creates enormous value for 
the defendant. Without it, defendants’ planned transactions will be burdened by potentially large con-
tingent liabilities and may even be enjoined. Upon reaching a preclusive settlement and resolving all 
shareholder claims, the transaction can move forward to closing.”). 
 91 Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 385 (Del. Ch. 2010). For example, 
consider the following provision, taken at random from a recent stipulation of settlement in a merger 
class action: 
[This Release grants] full and complete dismissal of the Action with prejudice, a per-
manent injunction barring, and . . . the settlement and release of: any claims, demands, 
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lease the greatest possible effect, class counsel separately agrees that the class 
members will waive any legal rights they may have that would limit the effect 
of the release.92 Appraisal actions and claims to enforce the settlement are typ-
ically the sole claims excluded from releases in the deal context.93 
The breadth of such releases and their ability to create lasting and far-
reaching impairments of shareholder rights, however, raises a nest of serious 
policy considerations. Overbroad releases have been held to trigger substantive 
due process concerns.94 Courts therefore may inquire into the fairness of the 
release at the time of settlement.95 Generally, however, courts engage in this 
                                                                                                                           
rights, actions, causes of action, . . . matters and issues known or unknown, contingent 
or absolute, suspected or unsuspected, disclosed or undisclosed, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, apparent or unapparent, that have 
been or could have been asserted in any court, tribunal, or proceeding (including but not 
limited to any claims arising under federal, state, foreign, or common law, including the 
federal securities laws and any state disclosure law) . . . which the Releasing Persons 
ever had, now have, or may have had by reason of, arising out of, relating to, or in con-
nection with the acts, events, facts, matters, transactions, occurrences, statements, or 
representations, set forth in or otherwise related, directly or indirectly, to the allegations 
in the Action, the Amended Complaint, financial or other advisory services in connec-
tion with the Merger, the Merger Agreement and any amendments thereto, and other 
transactions contemplated therein, or disclosures made in connection therewith (includ-
ing the adequacy and completeness of such disclosures) (the “Settled Claims”) . . . . 
Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release, at 8–9, In re Amerigroup 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7788-CS (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Amerigroup Stipulation] 
(extending the Release to a wide array of actual and potential defendants, including the company as 
well as its employees, accountants, legal and financial advisors). 
 92 The language of the example stipulation provides: 
The Settlement is intended to extinguish all of the Settled Claims . . . . Consistent with 
such intention . . . the Releasing Persons . . . waive and relinquish, to the fullest extent 
permitted by law, the provisions, rights, and benefits of any state, federal, or foreign 
law or principle of common law, which may have the effect of limiting the respective 
Settled Claims and Released Defendant Claims. 
Amerigroup Stipulation, supra note 91, at 13. 
 93 Brinckerhoff, 986 A.2d at 385 (noting that defendants prefer a release with the broadest possi-
ble scope and that the “language of a release typically extends to all possible claims, known or un-
known, asserted or unasserted, arising out of or relating to the events that were the subject of the liti-
gation); id. (“A standard global release also encompasses claims that could not have been litigated in 
the settled action, such as federal securities claims.”). 
 94 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 516 U.S. at 369; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
812 (1985). 
 95 In the words of former Chancellor Allen: 
[I]n the context of a claim that is acknowledged to be moot and in which no considera-
tion is to be paid to the class, it is not appropriate for the court to purport to release any 
claims of the class. The res judicata effect . . . is whatever it may be, but it would cer-
tainly offend fundamental notions of fairness to purport . . . to release claims that have 
never been advanced . . . in which there appears to be no serious discovery record . . . 
and most importantly, in exchange for no consideration. 
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inquiry only when the settlement is challenged by an objector,96 and objections 
to settlement are exceedingly rare.97 
In Delaware, the judicial rubric for evaluating the fairness of a release is 
whether the claims released were “based on the ‘same identical factual predi-
cate’ or the ‘same set of operative facts’ as the underlying action.”98 According 
to the Delaware Supreme Court: 
A release is overly broad if it releases claims based on a set of op-
erative facts that will occur in the future. If the facts have not yet 
occurred, then they cannot possibly be the basis for the underlying 
action . . . . Additionally, a release may be overbroad if it could be 
interpreted to encompass any claim that has some relationship—
however remote or tangential—to any fact, act, or conduct referred 
to in the Action. In other words, a release is overly broad if it releas-
es claims based on a common set of tangential facts, as opposed to 
operative or core facts.99 
The question therefore is not whether the release may bar other important 
forms of litigation from being brought.100 Rather, the question is merely 
whether the factual bases of released claims already in fact have occurred and 
whether released claims are related sufficiently to the settled litigation.101 Alt-
hough the question whether the underlying facts have or have not occurred is 
relatively straightforward, analysis of what is sufficiently related to the settled 
litigation requires judicial interpretation. Delaware courts applying this stand-
ard have held that state law disclosure-only settlements can validly release not 
                                                                                                                           
In re Advanced Mammography Servs., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 14831, 1996 WL 633409, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 96 The leading cases all involve shareholder objectors. See In re Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 945 
A.2d 1123, 1129 (Del. 2008); Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Del. 1989); Uni-
Super, Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 345 (Del. Ch. 2006).  
 97 For example, in the ten year period between 2003 and 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
entered 949 orders approving settlements. During that period, only 83 of such settlements were the 
subject of an objection. Moreover, many of these objections were one paragraph expressions of out-
rage and not the type of reasoned objection that courts are likely to take seriously. See, e.g., Transcript 
at 18–19, In re True Religion Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig., CA No. 8590-VCG (May 1, 2014) (quot-
ing from a brief “cri de coeur” objection but ultimately finding a benefit and awarding fees). 
 98 UniSuper, 898 A.2d at 347. 
 99 In re Phila. Stock Exch., 945 A.2d at 1146 (quoting In re UniSuper, 898 A.2d at 347). 
 100 The res judicata effect of a settlement or judgment can only be determined when the subse-
quent claim is brought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 516 U.S. at 396 (“A court conducting an action 
cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subse-
quent action.”); In re Phila. Stock Exch., 945 A.2d at 1147 (“[W]hether or not releasing the [related] 
claims will have preclusive effect in the related federal litigation is not an issue for this Court or the 
Court of Chancery to decide.”). 
 101 In re Phila. Stock Exch., 945 A.2d at 1146 (quoting In re UniSuper, 898 A.2d at 347). 
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only related fiduciary duty claims but also federal securities fraud claims be-
cause such claims arise from the same operative facts.102 
Nevertheless, it is an odd standard that requires a court to evaluate the 
facts under which a claim arises when the claim itself may not yet have arisen. 
In other words, only plaintiffs presently seeking to press another claim will 
have an opportunity to make an argument under the current standard. In many 
cases, however, including proxy fraud, whether a worthwhile claim exists will 
only be known later, long after the merger litigation has been settled, when the 
truth or falsity of statements made in the proxy ultimately is discovered. Alt-
hough it is true that plaintiffs can later argue that such cases should not be pre-
cluded, there is no way for them to challenge the settlement itself since, at the 
time of settlement, they do not know whether they possess valid claims.103 An 
alternative standard, looking at the value plaintiffs receive in exchange for the 
defendant’s release, was proposed by then-Chancellor Allen in the mid-
1990s.104 It has not been adopted, however. Instead, the courts have settled on 
a standard that provides for ineffective scrutiny of the breadth of the release, 
the ultimate result of which is that the litigation release may be worth consid-
erably more to defendants than what they give the shareholder class to settle 
the case. 
C. The Judicial Role in the Settlement of Shareholder Litigation 
Unlike purely private litigation, shareholder litigation cannot be settled 
without the involvement of a judge. Settlement agreements reached in share-
holder litigation, as in other forms of representative litigation, become binding 
on absent members of the class only upon the entry of a judicial order.105 
Shareholder litigation therefore invariably concludes with a hearing at which a 
judge performs three essential tasks. First, the judge must decide whether the 
settlement is “fair and reasonable.”106 Second, the judge must determine 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Nottingham Partners, 564 A.2d at 1107 (holding that a settlement of a Delaware fiduciary 
duty claim can release federal Rule 14a-9 claims because “although the two actions did not allege the 
identical nondisclosure claim, both actions arose under the same set of operative facts”). 
 103 On the subsequent determination of the preclusive effect of settlement, see supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. 
 104 See supra note 95. 
 105 Erichson, supra note 83, at 968–69 (“What binds the class is not the agreement between the 
defendant and the lead plaintiffs or class counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that 
agreement. The binding effect of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood as a function 
of judicial power.”). 
 106 Triarc Cos. Class & Derivative Litig., 791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001) (asking whether the 
settlement is “fair and reasonable in light of all relevant factors”). If the claim is a class, as opposed to 
derivative claim, the court will also be required to certify the class at the time of the settlement hear-
ing. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617–20 (1997) (noting that in certifying a 
class, the judge is charged with determining that the class meets the requirements of the class action 
rule, including adequacy of representation and of class counsel). Cases where classes are certified at 
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whether it is appropriate for the corporate defendant to pay plaintiffs’ attor-
neys’ fees. Third, if attorneys’ fees are awarded, judges must determine the 
ultimate amount of the fee award. Each of these judicial determinations in-
volves a distinct analytical framework, described below.107 
Evaluation of the fairness and reasonableness of settlement requires the 
judge to weigh the relief received in settlement against the strength of the plain-
tiffs’ claims.108 Although this analysis might seem to imply an adjudication of 
the merits of the claim, the judge’s role is in fact much more limited in scope, 
amounting to asking only whether the relief does rough justice to the claim.109 
Moreover, judges tempted to launch a thorough inquiry into the merits of a claim 
at the time of settlement face significant information asymmetries exacerbated 
by a non-adversarial process and an undeveloped factual record. 
Judges know far less about the quality of a case than the litigants.110 
Judges know only what lawyers tell them, and in the context of shareholder 
settlements, the lawyers do not tell them much. Merger litigation, for example, 
typically settles prior to the motion to dismiss.111 As a result, the judge will 
have received the initial complaint and answer but often no briefing of the 
merits or serious argument from either side concerning the quality of the case. 
Even more importantly, settlement hearings are non-adversarial, and both sides 
have a keen interest in winning judicial approval of the settlement agree-
ment.112 Defendants therefore do not oppose plaintiffs’ assertions that they 
                                                                                                                           
the same time that settlements are approved, most merger cases, constitute “settlement class actions.” 
See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 107 Although the discussion below is slanted towards the court’s role in approving class settle-
ments, the court’s role in approving derivative suits settlements is substantially similar. See DEL. CH. 
CT. R. 23.1 (requiring approval of the court for settlement); In re MAXXAM, Inc., 659 A2d 760, 768 
(Del. Ch. 1995) (emphasizing that public policy in favor of settlement must be balanced against policy 
of ensuring fairness of the settlement). 
 108 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 861 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that 
judges must “assess the strengths and weakness of the claims asserted in light of the discovery record 
and to evaluate the fairness and adequacy of the consideration offered . . . in exchange for the release 
of all claims made or arising from the facts alleged”). 
 109 Erichson, supra note 83, at 966 (“The court [in approving settlement] does not adjudicate the 
merits of the dispute, instead ruling only on the rough fairness of a deal that the court presumes re-
flects market price.”). 
 110 See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 90, at 1083–84 (discussing the problem of information 
asymmetry); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1272 (1995) 
(describing settlement process as a “black box” precluding serious judicial scrutiny); G. Donald Puck-
ett, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representation for Class Action Set-
tlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1279–83 (1999) (describing serious judicial review of class settle-
ments as “inherently futile”). 
 111 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 112 Griffith & Lahav, supra note 90, at 1093 (“The approval process that courts follow in deter-
mining fees awarded to class counsel is, in an important sense, nonadversarial.”); accord Alleghany 
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (quoted in In re Sauer-
Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011)) (“Once a settlement is agreed, the 
attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend their joint 
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have wrested a hard fought and highly beneficial settlement from the compa-
ny.113 Worse, the parties may engage in “confirmatory discovery” to document 
the value of their settlement after agreeing to it, in which case coached wit-
nesses will enter statements confirming the value of the settlement and the vi-
tal importance of the litigation in producing it. 
Judges who nevertheless press on with a serious inquiry into the fairness 
and reasonableness of settlement soon may confront a paradox. If the judge, 
having determined that a settlement is of no real value, refuses to approve it, 
plaintiffs may not respond by dropping the complaint. Plaintiffs instead may 
force defendants to litigate, at least to the motion to dismiss and potentially 
beyond.114 In such a situation, the judge’s finding that the settlement is of no 
merit may condemn the defendant to further rounds of non-meritorious litiga-
tion that may ultimately cost the defendant more than the settlement itself.115 
As noted in several recent Court of Chancery opinions, judges do not like to 
order litigants to incur waste.116 Once the parties know this, however, a game 
of chicken ensues, where the lawyers on both sides, understanding the reluc-
tance of judges to perpetuate the cycle of waste, are emboldened to conclude 
low-value settlements right up to the point where judges will reject them. 
Apart from reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement as 
a whole, judges also must rule on whether it is appropriate for defendants to 
pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. Theoretically, the court orders the defendant 
to pay attorneys’ fees. Given the non-adversarial nature of settlement hearings, 
however, the court in fact is in the posture of approving the defendant’s pay-
ment of attorneys’ fees. The award of attorneys’ fees typically is contested only 
in moot cases— that is, cases where there is no settlement agreement because 
                                                                                                                           
handiwork.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) (quoted in In re Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1137) (describing settlement 
hearings as “pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”). 
 113 There will be no argument, for example, over the actual contribution of plaintiffs in increasing 
the consideration in a controlling shareholder merger. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
Nor will either side engage the question whether a package of corporate therapeutics actually reflects 
the plaintiffs’ efforts in litigating a derivative suit or whether it is more the product, for example, of a 
prosecutorial or regulatory action that may have preceded or coincided with the derivative suit. See 
supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 114 Controlling shareholder merger litigation, for example, typically cannot be eliminated on the 
motion to dismiss. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 115 One source estimates defense costs involved in litigating a motion for preliminary injunction 
at $1.5 million. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 90, at 1081 n.122. 
 116 See, e.g., Transcript at 69, In re Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 8790-VCL 
(Del. Ch. May 5, 2014) (“Because I can’t approve the settlement today, I’m not going to reach class 
certification, which is contingent on the settlement. I’m also not going to grapple with the fee ques-
tion.”); Transcript at 24, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holder Litig., CA No. 7857-CS, (Del. Ch. Feb. 
26, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement of a merger claim on basis of a weak package of supple-
mental disclosures). 
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the relief sought in the shareholders’ claim has been rendered moot by an ac-
tion of the corporation.117 The fundamental basis of the fee award is the benefit 
plaintiffs have conferred upon the corporation or its shareholders. 
The doctrine under which courts award fees depends upon whether the 
benefit conferred is pecuniary or non-pecuniary in form. When fees are award-
ed for a monetary recovery or on the basis of a fund, the amount of which is 
either increased or protected by the settlement, then fees are awarded on the 
basis of the common fund doctrine.118 When, by contrast, the only relief is 
non-pecuniary in nature, fees can be awarded only on the basis of the corporate 
benefit doctrine.119 Although courts occasionally mix the terminology,120 the 
doctrines are not interchangeable.121 Qualifying for an award of fees under ei-
                                                                                                                           
 117 In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(“[U]ncertainty over the nature of the ‘benefit’ and its relation to the litigation may be expected to 
occur primarily in moot cases. Where a case has been litigated to a conclusion or settled, the nature of 
the ‘benefit’ and its causal connection to the litigation is ordinarily clear.”). Moot cases thus present 
an offshoot of the basic common fund/corporate benefit doctrine. As explained by the Delaware Su-
preme Court: 
Under the “mootness” exception, a court may award attorneys’ fees where the fee ap-
plicant demonstrates that: (1) the litigation was meritorious when filed, (2) the action 
rendering the litigation moot produced the same or a similar benefit sought by the liti-
gation, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the litigation and the action tak-
en producing the benefit. 
Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del. 2006) 
(accepting the further characterization of “the mootness doctrine [as] an extension of the corporate 
benefit exception”). 
 118 See Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1045 (Del. 1996) (“If the settlement of 
a class action is approved and has provided for a monetary recovery, the common fund doctrine per-
mits an attorney to independently request an award of fees from that same settlement fund.”); accord 
In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 23, 
1990) (“Under the common fund doctrine, a litigant who confers a common monetary benefit upon an 
ascertainable class is entitled to an allowance for fees and expenses to be paid from the fund or prop-
erty which his efforts have created.”). 
 119 Franklin Balance Sheet Investment Fund v. Crowley, Civ. A. No. 888-VCP, 2007 WL 
2495018, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Under the corporate benefit doctrine, a litigant who confers signifi-
cant and substantial benefit to a class, albeit not a tangible monetary one, is entitled to an allowance of 
fees and expenses.”); accord Dunkin’ Donuts, 1990 WL 189120, at *3 (“The corporate benefit doc-
trine comes into play when a tangible monetary benefit has not been conferred. It is enough, the doc-
trine holds, that the underlying litigation has ‘specifically and substantially’ benefited the class.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 120 See, e.g., United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. TakeCare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997) 
(“Delaware courts have long recognized the ‘common corporate benefit’ doctrine as a basis for the 
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and expenses in corporate litigation. Under this doctrine, a litigant 
who confers a common monetary benefit upon an ascertainable stockholder class is entitled to an 
award of counsel fees and expenses for its efforts in creating the benefit.” (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)). 
 121 In re Dunkin’ Donuts, 1990 WL 189120, at *4–5 (asserting the absence of “logical or legal 
support” for the “pick a doctrine” argument and emphasizing that courts do not “treat the doctrines as 
interchangeable”). 
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ther doctrine nevertheless requires the satisfaction of the same three condi-
tions.122 First, the claim must have been meritorious when filed.123 Second, the 
litigation must have benefited the corporation or the class. And third, the bene-
fit must be causally related to the lawsuit. 
Judges have been liberal in their interpretation of these requirements. 
First, as in the case of the merit review discussed above, the judicial inquiry 
into whether the claim was meritorious when filed does not amount to adjudi-
cation or even serious analysis of the merits of the claim. Instead, the court 
asks only whether plaintiffs have “some reasonable hope” of ultimate suc-
cess.124 The second condition invites inquiry into the existence of a benefit. 
This is uncontroversial in common fund cases—the benefit is the monetary 
relief. Although the recognition of benefit in cases involving non-pecuniary 
relief may seem more contestable, courts in fact have been generous in recog-
nizing non-pecuniary benefits, including disclosure-only settlements,125 
amendment settlements,126 and therapeutic derivative suit settlements.127 Alt-
hough the existence of precedent recognizing the benefits of such settlements 
does not necessarily compel courts to recognize such benefits in a particular 
case,128 judges have the same disincentive to deny corporate benefit that they 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. 1989) (stating the elements 
as “(a) the claim was meritorious when filed; (b) the action was benefiting the corporation or a class 
was created prior to judicial resolution of the suit; and (c) the benefit was causally related to the law-
suit”); accord In re Dunkin’ Donuts, 1990 WL 189120, at *5 (holding that “must show that (1) the 
action was meritorious at the time it was filed; (2) an ascertainable class received a substantial benefit; 
and (3) a causal connection existed between the action and the benefit”). 
 123 See, e.g., Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 879 (Del. 1980) (“The question 
of merit for the purposes of compensation is properly determined as of the commencement of the 
lawsuit and not by developments thereafter which could not have been known in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence at the time of filing.”). 
 124 Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966) (rejecting an analogy to the summary 
judgment standard in favor of the motion to dismiss standard and further explaining that “[t]he plain-
tiff must have some factual basis at least for the making of the charges”). 
 125 See, e.g., Transcript at 32, In re Copano Energy, LLC S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 8284-VCN 
(Del. Ch., Sept. 9, 2013) (stating that under current precedent the appropriate question in recognizing 
the benefit of supplemental disclosure is not how many shareholders “cared” nor whether “the addi-
tional information affected anyone’s vote or allowed anyone to vote with greater confidence or com-
form” but whether “the additional disclosures materially enhanced the [shareholders’] knowledge 
about the merger”). 
 126 See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., No 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at 
*28 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (awarding attorneys’ fees for benefit resulting from amendment of merger 
agreement’s deal protection terms). 
 127 See, e.g., In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ap-
proving settlement focusing on governance and compliance reforms in lawsuit brought in wake of justice 
department settlement with the company for illegal marketing); see In re Pfizer Inc. Shareholder Deriva-
tive Litigation, BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER & GROSSMANN, LLP, http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/
00143, archived at http://perma.cc/K9KP-RQX6 (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (describing the case and the 
settlement). 
 128 Accordingly courts have occasionally used their discretion to reject settlements on the basis of 
an inadequate benefit to the corporation or shareholder class. Transcript at 9, In re Amylin Pharm. 
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do to set aside settlements generally.129 Finally, with regard to causation, plain-
tiffs are presumed to have caused the benefit as long as it arose after litigation 
began.130 This presumption can be rebutted, but only upon proof that the law-
suit contributed in no way to the creation of the benefit.131 Moreover, the law-
suit need not be the sole or direct cause of the benefit.132 
Judges who grudgingly approve settlements either because they are una-
ble (under the applicable standards of review) or unwilling (due to their reluc-
tance to trigger further rounds of wasteful litigation) to do otherwise have a 
final opportunity to express their dissatisfaction in the third major decision 
they must make at settlement—that is, the determination of the fee amount. 
The determination of how much to award in fees is distinct from the determina-
tion of whether to award fees and proceeds according to the so-called “Sugar-
land factors.”133 In terms of process, once the parties agree upon a settlement, 
the plaintiffs will enter a fee request, which defendants typically will not op-
pose. The court will review the request in the same hearing at which it reviews 
fairness and adequacy and corporate benefit. 
Although a thorough review of fee awards is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, there is evidence that courts have been taking out their frustrations with the 
current system by knocking down fee awards, especially in the context of non-
pecuniary relief. For example, in the 2011 Delaware Court of Chancery case In 
re Sauer-Danfoss Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster closely ana-
lyzed a set of eleven supplemental disclosures for whether they provided mean-
ingful additional information to shareholders and, finding that only one did, re-
                                                                                                                           
S’holders Litig., C.A. 7673-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 2013) (refusing to recognize corporate benefit and 
therefore refusing to award a fee on the basis of  “additional meaningless disclosures that did not ma-
terially change the mix of information”).  
 129 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 130 Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 413 A.2d at 880 (noting that “[i]t is the defendant, and not the 
plaintiff, who is in a position to know the reasons, events and decisions leading up to the defendant’s 
action”). 
 131 Id. (placing burden on corporate defendants to demonstrate “that the lawsuit did not in any 
way cause their action”); United Vanguard Fund, 693 A.2d at 1080 (requiring proof that the lawsuit 
“did not in any way contribute” to the benefit created in order to rebut the presumption of causation). 
 132 In re Dunkin’ Donuts, 1990 WL 189120, at *6 (“To establish the necessary causation . . . the 
benefit need not be directly and entirely attributable to the underlying litigation.”). 
 133 Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149–50 (Del. 1980). The Sugarland factors 
include: 
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the case by counsel for the plaintiffs; (ii) the 
relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the standing and ability of petitioning coun-
sel; (iv) the contingent nature of the litigation; (v) the stage at which the litigation end-
ed; (vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the benefit conferred 
or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the benefit conferred. 
In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 
2005) (citing and applying the Sugarland factors). 
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duced the fee award from the requested $750,000 to $75,000.134 Numerous re-
cent Chancery Court decisions have applied similar logic, dramatically reducing 
requested fee awards in disclosure-only settlements, even in the absence of op-
position from defendants or objectors.135 The reduction of fee amounts thus may 
be taken as an expression of judicial dissatisfaction with the process generally.136 
Fee reductions, however, are not likely to solve the crisis in shareholder litiga-
tion because they are ad hoc and scattered, more the luck of the judicial draw 
than a comprehensive program of reform. Moreover, although fee reductions 
may reduce the overcompensation of plaintiffs’ attorneys, they fail to address the 
undercompensation of the plaintiff class.137 
D. The Crisis in Shareholder Litigation 
The patterns outlined above reveal a crisis in shareholder litigation. Fil-
ings cluster around public events—the announcement of a merger or, in the 
context of derivative suits, a regulatory investigation or securities filing—and 
settlement patterns are dictated not by the plaintiffs’ investigatory efforts but 
by timing considerations of the underlying transaction or the regulatory action. 
The result in each case is a proliferation of low value settlements that neverthe-
less entitle the plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover fees from the corporation. 
The overcompensation of attorneys on both sides of shareholder litigation 
is only the most visible sign of the crisis, however. The less visible but poten-
tially more sinister aspect of the current system is the systematic undercom-
pensation of the plaintiff class. This becomes clear upon consideration of the 
defense side to the settlement bargain. Defendants willingly pay plaintiffs’ at-
torneys fees in exchange for extremely broad litigation releases. The ability of 
such broadly worded releases to extinguish meaningful claims is not merely 
potential. It is actual. For example, In re Rural Metro Corp. Shareholders Liti-
gation, the bad banker case that recently resulted in liability and potentially 
significant damages, was nearly settled for supplemental disclosures. This re-
                                                                                                                           
 134 65 A.3d at 1137. 
 135 Transcript at 6, In re Gen-Probe S’holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2013); In 
re PAETEC Holding Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6761-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 19, 2013).  
 136 Transcript of Oral Arguments on Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Ex-
penses at 58, In re Del Monte Foods Co., C.A. No. 6027-VCL (“How do I price this stuff? . . . 
[Y]ou’ve just thrown in a number. And it may be a false sense of analytical clarity, but I am at least 
trying. . . . So, you know, I have a lot of trouble with the idea of ‘Well, we got a lot of stuff. And so 
we get a lot of money.’ . . . I’ll be honest with you, Ceridian, Yahoo!, Alberto-Culver, I don’t get how 
they get to the numbers there. I think the Court, as we regularly do, gave a lot of deference to the 
negotiations between counsel; but there isn’t a lot of analysis as to how you get to a number.” (quoting 
Vice Chancellor Laster)). 
 137 Because fee reductions typically do not include a concomitant reduction in the breadth of the 
litigation release, they represent, essentially, a windfall gain to defendants. 
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sult was averted, narrowly, by a shareholder objection.138 The dogs that don’t 
bark may be worse. Recall that disclosure-only settlements release proxy fraud 
claims. What if the securities claims in the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch 
case, a $2.43 billion proxy fraud settlement, had been released by a disclosure-
only settlement?139 There is no way of knowing how many such cases are si-
lently extinguished by a release in a prior shareholder suit. 
Furthermore, it is not merely a question of compensation. A basic public 
policy goal of shareholder litigation, arguably more fundamental than compen-
sation, is the deterrence of potential corporate wrongdoers. Deterrence objec-
tives, however, are not served by a system that thrives on a high volume of low 
value settlements.140 Considering that standard deterrence theory sets sanctions 
at a level reflecting the net social cost of misconduct multiplied by the proba-
bility of detection, bad actors are not plausibly deterred by a litigation system 
that exposes the corporation to little more than payment of attorneys’ fees.141 
Moreover, the common perception that such claims lack merit—a view fueled 
by the high volume of filings and the dearth of significant recoveries—itself 
diminishes the reputational impact of being made to defend such a suit.142 It is 
hard to see how deterrence is served by suits with no meaningful financial or 
reputational consequence. This is a system in crisis. How the law ought to re-
spond is the subject of the remainder of this Article. 
II. THE APPEARANCE OF FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS 
Fee-shifting bylaws emerged, in the wake of the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in ATP Tour v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, as a structural re-
sponse to the crisis in shareholder litigation. Companies began adopting these 
provisions as soon as Delaware tabled its plan to ban them.143 The following 
bylaw provision, adopted in the first week of July 2014, is typical: 
                                                                                                                           
 138 88 A.3d 54, 110 (Del. Ch. 2014) (allowing damages in claim involving investment banker 
conflict of interest). On the successful objection to the disclosure settlement, see generally Transcript, 
In re Rural Metro Corp., No. 6350-VCL, (Del. Ch., Jan. 17, 2012) (settlement hearing where objec-
tors are given control over subsequent litigation of case). 
 139 See Peter J. Henning & Steven Davidoff Solomon, For Bank of America, More Trouble from 
Merrill Lynch Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/the-cost-
of-putting-the-merrill-lynch-merger-behind-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/942H-GLB4. 
 140 See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 1733, 1736 (1994) (“[A] derivative suit increases corporate value in two circumstances: if the 
prospect of suit deters misconduct or, alternatively, if the suit itself yields a positive recovery net of all 
costs that the corporation must bear as a consequence of suit.”). 
 141 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 483 (2004). 
 142 James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L.REV. 3, 11 (1999). 
 143 Early adopters of bylaws shifting fees to shareholders included Hemispherx, Echo Therapeu-
tics, LGL Group, all of whom adopted fee-shifting bylaws in early July 2014. See Hemispherx 8-K 
(“On July 3, 2014, the Board amended and restated the Company’s By-Laws to provide for fee-
shifting to stockholders who engage in unsuccessful litigation and to require certain stockholders who 
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In the event that . . . any current or former security holder of the 
Company . . . initiates, asserts, maintains or continues against the 
Company any litigation . . . arising in whole or in part out of any In-
ternal Matter . . . and . . . does not obtain a judgment on the merits 
that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy 
sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and sev-
erally to reimburse the Company . . . for all fees, costs, and expenses 
of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses) that the Com-
pany . . . incurred in connection with such Claim.144 
Such provisions seek to respond to the perceived excesses in shareholder liti-
gation by discouraging claims.145 The response, however, is overbroad, aimed 
at deterring shareholder claims per se, rather than more precisely targeting the 
causes of frivolous litigation. Because such provisions chill the good claims 
along with the bad, they fail to advance the fundamental public policy interests 
underlying shareholder litigation. 
Those wishing to challenge the current crop of fee-shifting provisions 
have two potential angles of attack: substance and form. The substantive chal-
lenge focuses on the fee-shifting rule itself, attacking its implications in law 
and policy. The formal challenge focuses on bylaws as the mode of adoption, 
arguing that regardless of the substantive validity of a fee-shifting rule, a by-
law amendment is not the right means of enacting the rule. Because each of 
these challenges raises fundamentally different issues, the sections below re-
view them separately, ultimately concluding that Delaware has strong reasons 
to reject the current generation of fee-shifting bylaws. 
A. The Substantive Proposal: Fee-Shifting 
Fee-shifting, of course, was not invented for shareholder litigation. The 
rule that unsuccessful parties in litigation must pay their opponents’ fees and 
                                                                                                                           
engage in litigation to post security to cover the estimated expenses of litigation should the stockhold-
er be unsuccessful.”); Liz Hoffman, New ‘Loser Pays’ Option Attracts Two Companies, WALL ST. J., 
July 7, 2014, at B6, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/proceedings-highlights-from-the-law-
blog-1404687854?mod=_newsreel_2, archived at https://perma.cc/TW3L-PFN9?type=pdf. 
 144 HEMISPHERX BYLAWS § 5.7(a) (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
946644/000094664414000012/a31amendedandrestatedby-la.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/F2FZ-
DAAT?type=pdf. “Internal Matter” is defined in the bylaw to include derivative actions, claims alleg-
ing breach of fiduciary duty, claims arising under the Delaware General Corporate Law, claims arising 
under the federal securities laws, and claims governed by the internal affairs doctrine. Id. 
 145 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 143 (quoting the statement of Echo Therapeutics upon adoption 
of its fee-shifting bylaw: “Echo’s Board and management team believe that it is in our shareholders’ 
best interests to focus our limited resources on our ongoing product-development efforts rather than 
responding to frivolous litigation.” (emphasis added)). 
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expenses is widely followed elsewhere in the world, not just in England.146 
Although the general rule in the United States is that litigants bear their own 
costs, fee-shifting often has been proposed to solve perceived excesses in the 
litigation system.147 Moving to a fee-shifting rule, by changing the expected 
cost of litigation, changes the incentives of the parties to litigate. Although the 
general effect of fee-shifting on civil litigation often may be ambiguous and 
unpredictable, a movement to fee-shifting in the context of shareholder litiga-
tion likely will substantially eliminate claims activity.148 
Legal scholars focusing on fee-shifting have evaluated its impact on three 
distinct incentives: (1) the incentive to file claims, (2) the incentive to invest in 
claims, and (3) the incentive to settle claims. First, with regard to the incentive 
to file, fee-shifting encourages the filing of suits with a high probability of 
success without regard to the cost of litigation, leading simultaneously to more 
low-value/high probability claims and fewer high-value/ low probability 
claims.149 Second, fee-shifting often increases the costs of litigated cases since 
each side will discount the expected cost of further investment in the case by 
the probability that such costs will ultimately be borne by the opponent.150 In 
particular, fee-shifting increases defendants’ incentive to invest heavily in the 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1597–1601 (1993) (discussing other jurisdictions 
adopting fee-shifting regimes similar to the English Rule). 
 147 For example, a widely supported provision of the Republican “Contract with America” in the 
mid-1990s would have adopted fee-shifting for federal cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. See 
generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays 
Attorney Fee-Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317 (1998) (discussing fee-
shifting through the lens of the “Contract with America”). Likewise, a loser-pays rule was proposed as 
a means to curb medical malpractice litigation in the more recent debate over health-care reform. 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Open to Reining in Medical Suits, N.Y TIMES, June 15, 
2009, at A1 (discussing medical malpractice reform in context of health-care reform). 
 148 See Katz & Sanchirico, supra note 19, at 271–72 (summarizing “the main lesson of the eco-
nomic literature on fee-shifting” as “the effects of cost shifting on the amount and intensity of litiga-
tion are substantially more complicated than a superficial consideration of the matter might suggest”). 
 149 Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods 
for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 73 (1982) (arguing that because the expected 
cost to the litigant is reduced by the potential that it will be paid by the other side, the litigant will 
have an incentive to pursue more claims whose value is low relative to the probability of success); see 
Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 
(1990) (analogizing parties incentives in litigation to the pricing of an option, which increases with 
volatility). 
 150 Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee-Shifting Systems, 47 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 180 (1984) (“[A] movement from the American system to one favoring suc-
cessful defendants will indeed encourage defendants to spend more in their own defense . . . . [T]he 
total expenditures by the two parties combined will increase.”); Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand 
for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987) (“[T]he 
English rule provides a probabilistic subsidy to the purchase of legal services, since a party contem-
plating the expenditure of an additional unit of services knows that she will not bear its cost if she 
wins the lawsuit.”). 
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defense of nuisance claims, using the potential infliction of substantial legal 
costs as a weapon to discourage claims.151 Third, the impact of fee-shifting on 
settlement is ambiguous, but because it amplifies the parties’ relative optimism 
and degree of information asymmetry, fee-shifting discourages settlement un-
der most economic models.152 
Whatever the effects of a move to fee-shifting may be in other contexts, it 
almost certainly will kill shareholder litigation because it would force repre-
sentative litigants to bear individual responsibility for the full cost of an unsuc-
cessful suit. Economically rational shareholders will thus be deterred from 
bringing claims unless their proportional share of the recovery exceeds the full 
cost of litigation, after both the recovery and the cost are adjusted for probabil-
ity.153 In such an environment, only large blockholders will likely find it 
worthwhile to sue and only in rare cases. The result is an entire class of merito-
rious cases that is never brought simply because the prospective defendants 
lack a sufficiently large blockholder. Ownership composition, obviously, has 
nothing to do with the merits of a claim, nor does it make sense to render firms 
without significant blockholders unaccountable to their shareholders.  
Plaintiffs’ law-firms might attempt to respond to this problem by offering 
to indemnify shareholders for the full cost of litigation, win or lose. But will 
they? There are likely to be meritorious cases that are simply too risky for 
plaintiffs’ firms to take on, especially cases involving significant investigation 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous Lawsuits and 
Fee-Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 147, 156 (1998) (“[F]ee shifting is 
highly effective in reducing the number of lawyers engaged in nuisance suits.”); David Rosenberg & 
Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. OF L. & 
ECON. 3, 5 (1985) (“Under the British system, a plaintiff who would be unwilling to litigate would 
never file a claim; in particular, nuisance suits would never occur.”).  
 152 First, fee-shifting may magnify the effects of optimism, making litigants less likely to settle. 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT 164, 172 (eds. Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, 1974) (noting that the more 
likely a defendant believes that his legal fees will be eliminated or subsidized, the lower the cost dif-
ferential between a trial and a settlement, and the more likely he will proceed to trial); John P. Gould, 
The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 287 (1973) (“[T]he implied uncertainty that 
A has about B’s case (and vice versa) may put off an out-of-court settlement until the case gets near to 
trial or until the evidence is actually presented in court.”); see also Shavell, supra note 149, at 57 
(formally demonstrating this intuition). Second, fee-shifting may reduce the likelihood of settlement 
by increasing uncertainty, leading to a higher degree of asymmetric information. See Robert Cooter et 
al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
225, 226 (1982) (articulating this principle); see also Mitchell A. Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Does the English Rule Discourage Low-probability-of-prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519, 
533–35 (1998) (pointing out that the increase in information asymmetry may lead to lower quality 
tried cases in a fee-shifting regime). 
 153 The hurdle for bringing suit, in other words, is not just that probable gains exceed probable 
losses but that the shareholder plaintiff’s proportional share of probable gains exceed the full amount 
of probable losses. 
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and, therefore, higher costs.154 Moreover, many plaintiffs will rightly question 
the credit-worthiness of plaintiffs’ law firms and their ability to meet their in-
demnification obligations in a major (or even minor) case.155 Finally, it is im-
portant to recall that in the context of shareholder litigation, the starting point 
is not the American Rule, under which each side bears its own costs, but rather 
the Delaware Rule, under which the corporation always pays. Adopting fee-
shifting therefore will not lead to more litigation since, under the Delaware 
Rule, every possible case is already brought.156 Any movement from the ex-
treme generosity of the current Delaware Rule on fees, in other words, will 
indeed deter litigation, as intended by those companies adopting fee-shifting 
bylaws. 
The problem with current fee-shifting proposals is not that they deter 
shareholder litigation, but that they deter it indiscriminately. The extreme los-
er-pays position of current bylaw proposals takes no account of the merits of 
the underlying claim and, considering the amplified deterrent effect on repre-
sentative actions, thus will discourage good and bad cases alike from ever be-
ing brought. There are examples of fee-shifting rules that force the losing party 
to pay only after a finding that the claim fundamentally lacked merit.157 Condi-
tioning fee-shifting not just on success but also on the weakness of the oppo-
nent’s claim may do a better job than either the English or American Rules.158 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Fee-shifting thus creates an incentive to bring low-risk, low-investigation cost claims rather 
than higher-risk claims that involve significant investigation and therefore greater defense costs. This 
flips the conventional assumption—that claims involving greater investigation are more meritorious—
on its head and seems likely to lead to an underinvestment in meritorious claims. See, e.g., Tom Baker 
& Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities Settle-
ments, 157 U. PA. L. Rev. 755, 769–71 (2009); Steven J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 43 (2009).  
 155 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in Fed-
eral Court?—The Case for Preemption, Testimony Before the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, 10 
(Columbia Law Sch. Law and Econ. Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 498, 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508973, archived at http://perma.cc/V5FB-H2LM 
(“[I]f a bold plaintiff’s law firm did sue, it would likely have to agree to indemnify the class repre-
sentative from fee-shifting, and some class representatives might decline the position, fearing that the 
plaintiff’s firm could not fully protect them.”) 
 156 At least in the context of merger litigation. See supra notes 75–137 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Katz & Sanchirico, supra note 19, at 292 (listing examples including “the common-law 
torts of barratry, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution . . . sanctions for discovery abuse . . . 
and the . . . provisions of the Internal Revenue Code requiring the government to pay a taxpayer’s 
reasonable litigation costs upon a court finding that the government’s position in a tax dispute was 
substantially unjustified”); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 N.D. 
L. REV. 1621, 1646 (2012) (noting a Tennessee proposal that would shift some litigation costs to 
plaintiffs only if they lost on the motion to dismiss). 
 158 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin 
of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 
374 (1996) (demonstrating that conditioning fee-shifting on the margin of victory does a better job of 
conforming prospective litigants’ conduct to their ex ante estimate of the quality of their case). 
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Unfortunately, current fee-shifting proposals do none of this. As a result, they 
do indeed operate to deprive shareholders of valuable substantive rights. 
Delaware cannot accept this outcome. Delaware law seeks to strike a 
careful balance between managers and shareholders.159 By discouraging share-
holder suits per se, Delaware law would adopt a pronounced anti-shareholder 
slant. This not only offends the corporate bar, a core constituency inside Dela-
ware, it would also open the state to the risk of preemption by the federal gov-
ernment.160 Delaware therefore needs a means of backing away from the sub-
stantive outcome of current fee-shifting proposals, both as a matter of principle 
and as a matter of politics. 
A promising judicial route of retreat might be to focus on the distinction 
between individual versus representative litigation and the distinction between 
closely-held organizations versus diffusely-held public corporations. It might 
be more acceptable to shift fees to an individual suing merely for himself than 
to a class representative or derivative suit plaintiff. The extreme asymmetries 
provoked by fee-shifting in the context of representative litigation make it a 
strong candidate for judicial invalidation, unless perhaps the risk of unsuccess-
ful litigation could be spread across the class as a whole.161 In the context of 
closely-held organizations like ATP, it indeed may be possible to spread the 
cost of litigation across the plaintiff class as a whole, requiring merely that 
owners be sent a bill for their proportional share of litigation costs, the equiva-
lent of an additional capital call. But in the context of diffusely-held public 
corporations, this is plainly impossible. Even if it were administrable for the 
corporation to send a bill to each shareholder, shareholders would not pay 
them, understanding (rightly) that their liability as shareholders is capped at 
the amount of their initial investment.162 This logic suggests that the easiest 
way to achieve fee-shifting for representative actions in the context of widely 
held corporations is to have the corporation pay the bill, thereby reducing the 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Cor-
porate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1095 (2000) (“[Delaware] courts have responded to takeo-
ver litigation with an attempt to balance deference to management decisionmaking with concern over 
shareholder treatment.”). 
 160 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (2005) (noting that the threat of federal preemption pressures the 
Delaware judiciary to continuously balance the interests of shareholders and corporate board); Sean J. 
Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 22–23 (2006) (alarming to the undesirable effects of federal preemption of state law corporate 
governance); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 607–21 (2003) (summa-
rizing the history of the federalization of corporate law, by way of federal legislative enactments in 
response to large-scale corporate failures, from the federal securities acts in the 1930s to Sarbanes-
Oxley in 2002). Indeed, the SEC’s hearings on fee-shifting foreshadow the possibility of federal pre-
emption on this point. See Coffee, supra note 155 (discussing testimony before the SEC). 
 161 On the asymmetries of fee-shifting in the representative context, see supra note 153 and ac-
companying text. 
 162 Indeed, this is the definition of limited liability. 
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wealth of each shareholder proportionally, the precise outcome that advocates 
of fee-shifting are seeking to escape.163 This demonstration of circularity, start-
ing from the premise that it is inappropriate to shift fees to an individual for 
bringing representative litigation, would allow courts to deny the applicability 
of fee-shifting to diffusely held public corporations without overruling the spe-
cific holding of ATP Tour. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Delaware should invalidate fee-
shifting per se. Rather, Delaware should leave room for fee-shifting to be ap-
plied more narrowly, in a way that distinguishes good cases from bad ones, a 
proposal for which is articulated in Part IV, below.164 Judicial rather than legis-
lative invalidation of the current generation of fee-shifting bylaws therefore 
might be preferable, since judicial invalidation likely would leave more room 
for corporate planners to design more narrowly tailored provisions.165 
B. The Procedural Form: Bylaw Arguments 
Putting aside concerns over the substantive operation of fee-shifting, is it 
appropriate to adopt fee-shifting by means of a bylaw amendment? From the 
corporation’s perspective, this route of adoption has much to commend it.166 
Unlike the corporate charter, the board typically has the power to amend by-
laws without shareholder approval.167 But should such a bylaw amendment be 
upheld? 
Until recently, much of the developed caselaw concerning bylaw amend-
ments focused on limits on the power of shareholders to amend bylaws. The 
adoption of anti-poison pill bylaws, for example, was stymied by the “recur-
sive loop” 168 between shareholders’ statutory authority to adopt bylaws “not 
inconsistent with law,”169 and the board’s statutory authority to manage the 
                                                                                                                           
 163 This result is also rejected by this Article for both doctrinal and policy reasons in Parts III and 
IV, below. See infra notes 195–311 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 253–311 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra notes 158 and accompanying text (suggesting another approach to fee-shifting). 
 166 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2014) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not incon-
sistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the 
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, 
officers or employees.” (emphasis added)). 
 167 The statute expressly gives voting shareholders the power to amend shareholders but allows 
corporations to give directors co-equal power to amend the bylaws. § 109(a). Every well-counseled 
corporation confers this power on directors. 
 168 Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 (1997). 
 169§ 109(b). This limitation obviously applies to any provision of the Delaware General Corporate 
Law, not just § 141(a). See, e.g., Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 402 (Del. 2010) 
(invalidating bylaw amendment conflicting with statutory procedure for removing and electing direc-
tors at annual meeting). 
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firm.170 Efforts to use bylaws to pry open the nomination process were similar-
ly stalemated until the Delaware Supreme Court sought to break the recursive 
loop by distinguishing procedure, a proper subject for bylaws, from substance, 
an improper subject for bylaws.171 In the court’s words, “a proper function of 
bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive 
business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which 
those decisions are made.”172 
The inapplicability of this caselaw to director-sponsored bylaws should 
be apparent. Does it make sense to limit board authority to adopt bylaws on the 
basis of the board’s authority to manage the corporation? The substance-
procedure distinction likewise makes little sense when applied to board-
sponsored bylaws because any bylaw adopted by a board that had the effect of 
curbing its substantive authority would also be susceptible to subsequent re-
peal by the board in exercise of its substantive authority.173 Perhaps in recogni-
tion of the apparent circularity of this reasoning, Delaware courts have tended 
to view board-sponsored bylaw amendments as a much more straight-forward 
application of contract doctrine. 
Most notably, in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron 
Corp., then-Chancellor Strine upheld director-sponsored forum-selection bylaws 
from facial challenge on the basis of the corporate contract to which sharehold-
ers assent when they buy their shares.174 Because the board’s power to adopt 
bylaws is an express term of the contract when shareholders buy in, shareholders 
are bound under the terms of the contract when the board subsequently exercises 
that power.175 The court’s reasoning thus draws upon the “corporation-as-
contract” metaphor that has long informed corporate law scholarship,176 but 
                                                                                                                           
 170 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a). See D. Gordon Smith, et al., Private Ordering with Share-
holder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 141 (2011) (“[A]ny purely textual examination of the 
DGCL reveals this unremitting circularity.”). 
 171 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008). 
 172 Id. at 234–35. 
 173 This would be problematic only where the board had made a binding commitment to follow 
and not amend or repeal a bylaw they had adopted, a problem the court may have had in mind in its 
reference to “the prohibition, which our decisions have derived from Section 141(a), against contrac-
tual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude them 
from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 238. 
 174 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“In an unbroken line of decisions dating back several gen-
erations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract 
between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”). 
 175 Id. at 956 (“[S]tockholders have assented to a contractual framework established by the DGCL 
and the certificates of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that stockholders will be bound by by-
laws adopted unilaterally by their boards. Under that clear contractual framework, the stockholders 
assent to not having to assent to board-adopted bylaws.”). 
 176 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (arguing that the rules and practices of corporate law replicate the effects 
of the contracts into which interested parties in a corporate enterprise could have entered). 
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takes a further step in making it literally so, at least with regard to director-
sponsored bylaws.177 
This corporation-as-contract reasoning was then applied by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in ATP Tour to uphold the facial validity of fee-shifting by-
laws.178 Because bylaws are contracts and because contracts opting into a fee-
shifting rule have been upheld in a variety of other contexts,179 fee-shifting 
provisions may be legitimately adopted in bylaws.180 Having found firm foot-
ing for the decision on contract principles, the ATP Tour court did not even 
consider the substance-procedure dichotomy.181 ATP Tour thus amounts to a 
straightforward application of the contract logic of Boilermakers. 
The contract reasoning in Boilermakers, however, is undergirded by the 
ability of shareholders who are displeased by a board-adopted bylaw to take 
action against it.182 Dissatisfied shareholders can pass their own bylaw rescind-
ing the action of the board.183 Alternatively, in cases of extreme displeasure, 
                                                                                                                           
 177 In case the lesson was unclear, the Chancellor summarized this aspect of his holding as fol-
lows: 
In sum, stockholders contractually assent to be bound by bylaws that are valid under the 
DGCL—that is an essential part of the contract agreed to when an investor buys stock 
in a Delaware corporation. Where, as here, the certificate of incorporation has conferred 
on the board the power to adopt bylaws, and the board has adopted a bylaw consistent 
with 8 Del. C. § 109(b), the stockholders have assented to that new bylaw being con-
tractually binding. 
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 958; see also Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 
(Del. 2010) (“[C]harters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders.”). 
 178 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2013). 
 179 See, e.g., Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Del. 2013) (“‘An 
exception to [the American R]ule is found in contract litigation that involves a fee-shifting provi-
sion.’” (citations omitted)); see also John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and 
Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1102 
(1991) (discussing contexts where fee-shifting provisions had been adopted by contract). 
 180 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558 (“Because corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders,’ a fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation’s validly-enacted bylaw 
would fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule. Therefore, a fee-shifting bylaw 
would not be prohibited under Delaware common law.”). 
 181 There is an argument that because fee-shifting bylaws make shareholder suits economically 
irrational, they impact whether, not merely how shareholders can sue. See supra note 153. As such, 
they could be treated as substantive rather than procedural and therefore an inappropriate subject for 
bylaws. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 951–52 (holding that forum-selection bylaws are “process-
oriented” because they “regulate where stockholders may file suit, not whether the stockholder may 
file suit or the kind of remedy that the stockholder may obtain on behalf of herself or the corpora-
tion”). 
 182 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955 n.93 (“For present purposes . . . the issue is not whether 
someone might deem it more legitimate in some sense to proceed by an amendment to the certificate 
of incorporation rather than by a bylaw. That decision was for the Chevron and FedEx boards in the 
first instance, and the stockholders have multiple tools to hold the boards accountable if the stock-
holders disagree with it.” (emphasis added)). 
 183 Id. at 956 (“[T]he statutory regime provides protections for the stockholders, through the inde-
feasible right of the stockholders to adopt and amend bylaws themselves. . . . Thus, even though a 
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shareholders can vote the offending directors out of office.184 And, perhaps 
most importantly, shareholders can sue after the fact to demonstrate the inequi-
ty of the bylaw as applied in a subsequent dispute.185 
In the context of fee-shifting, however, self-help is of much less avail to 
shareholders. First, although shareholders have the formal power to adopt their 
own bylaw rescinding a bylaw passed by the board, their ability to do so is in 
fact limited by the inability of the shareholder base to organize, especially in 
the context of a diffusely held public corporation on an issue that is actively 
opposed by management.186 Shareholders may coalesce to amend the bylaws 
in the context of a takeover battle or a proxy fight.187 The repeal of a fee-
shifting bylaw, however, has no obvious inciting incident—it is unlikely to 
arise in connection with either takeovers or proxy fights—and therefore no 
likely champion to organize the repeal effort.188 
Likewise, shareholders’ ability to seek recourse by demonstrating the in-
equitable workings of fee-shifting as applied to their case devolves into a 
catch-22. In order for fee-shifting to be found inequitable, there must be a case 
in controversy. In order for there to be a case in controversy, a claim must be 
brought. However, fee-shifting bylaws operate to deter claims from ever being 
brought. Therefore fee-shifting bylaws, by eliminating the shareholders’ claims 
in the first place, will preclude shareholders from ever attacking their operation 
as inequitable. The ATP Tour court appears to have missed this dynamic in 
their recitation of standard Delaware cases preserving the ability of sharehold-
ers to challenge facially valid governance terms on an as applied basis.189 In 
the context of fee-shifting, there is likely to be no such opportunity. Instead, 
the shareholders’ ability to protest will be stolen silently by a unilateral action 
of the board. 
                                                                                                                           
board may, as is the case here, be granted authority to adopt bylaws, stockholders can check that au-
thority by repealing board-adopted bylaws.”). 
 184 Id. at 956–57 (“And, of course, because [Delaware General Corporate Law] gives stockholders 
an annual opportunity to elect directors, stockholders have a potent tool to discipline boards who re-
fuse to accede to a stockholder vote repealing a forum selection clause.”). 
 185 Id. at 957 (“The forum selection bylaws . . . are considered presumptively, but not necessarily, 
situationally enforceable.”). 
 186 Cf. Smith et al., supra note 170, at 129 (“The main impediment to private ordering in public 
corporations is the difficulty of conducting a negotiation involving widely dispersed shareholders.”) 
Diffuse ownership makes informal coordination impossible. Being a public company further inhibits 
shareholder communications by requiring compliance with the proxy rules. And managerial opposi-
tion means the only way to succeed is to wage and win a costly proxy fight. 
 187 There are several examples of shareholders repealing bylaws in the context of takeover battles 
and proxy fights. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1184 (examining the broader proposition that 
amendments happen in takeover context); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 354 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (discussing the repeal of staggered board provision in the bylaws). 
 188 Except, perhaps, proxy advisory firms, discussed below. See infra notes 190–193 and accom-
panying text. 
 189 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558–59. 
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The greatest constraint on boards’ ability to adopt fee-shifting bylaws ul-
timately may be the second corrective measure referred to in Boilermakers—
that is, the ability of shareholders to vote against directors who adopt fee-
shifting bylaws. The typical inability of shareholders to act cohesively around 
corporate governance issues can be and often is overcome when proxy adviso-
ry firms take strong positions with regard to specific governance issues. A 
powerful recent example involves the board adoption of bylaws purporting to 
disqualify director nominees who received a portion of their compensation 
from outside sources, typically activist investors.190 The majority of companies 
adopting this bylaw immediately repealed it when Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”), the most important proxy-advisory service, issued a strongly 
worded memo threatening to recommend a vote against any director nominee 
that had adopted the disqualification bylaw.191 Fee-shifting bylaws would seem 
to present an even more significant opportunity for proxy advisors to organize 
shareholder opposition to director sponsored bylaws.192 But for ISS, however, 
it would seem that shareholders have very little real power to constrain boards 
from adopting fee-shifting bylaws.193 
The disconnect between Boilermakers and ATP Tour thus lies in the 
court’s failure to perceive the distinction between shareholders’ ability to en-
gage in self-help in the forum-selection context and their inability to do so in 
the fee-shifting context.194 Yet it is an important distinction, the clear implica-
                                                                                                                           
 190 The compensation arrangements were referred to as “golden leashes” in the financial press, 
reflecting the suspicion that directors receiving outside compensation would be tied more to the source 
of that consideration, often several orders of magnitude higher than customary director compensation, 
than to the corporation itself. See Matthew D. Cain et al., The Case of the Golden Leash 3–5 (Dec. 20, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 191 Institutional Shareholder Services, Wheeling Out the Procrustean Bed: Bylaw Restrictions on 
Dissident Nominee Compensation, M&A EDGE NOTE: N. AM. 1, 3 (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.
thedeal.com/first_word/Wheeling_Out_the_Procrustean_Bed_-_Bylaw_Restrictions_on_Dissident_
Nominee_Compensation-1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/D4GZ-8LE8?type=pdf. 
 192 The most recent revision to the ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines foreshadows this opposition, 
citing unilateral charter or bylaw amendments that diminish shareholder rights as a basis for recom-
mending votes against individual directors, committees, or entire boards, and likewise identifying fee-
shifting provisions as key provisions impacting the ability of shareholders to bring suit against the 
company. United States Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates: 2015 Benchmark Policy Recommenda-
tions, INT’L S’HOLDER SERVS. 3, 6–7 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/
2015USPolicyUpdates.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/ND5E-ZSTW?type=pdf. 
 193 Whether fundamental matters of corporate policy should be delegated to a private for-profit 
firm is an important question outside the scope of the present Article. See generally Stephen Choi et 
al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010) (discussing the appar-
ent influence of proxy advisors on shareholder voting and identifying various possible reasons for the 
relationship). 
 194 Moreover, as alluded to above, Delaware has political economy reasons for looking favorably 
upon forum selection (i.e., retaining its place the national corporate law-maker) and disfavorably upon 
fee-shifting (i.e., risking horizontal pre-emption by offending core constituencies on both sides of the 
corporate bar and vertical pre-emption by demonstrating too great a pro-management bias). See supra 
notes 159–160 and accompanying text. 
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tion of which is that in the absence of significant ex post constraints on the 
ability of boards to abuse shareholders through the bylaw process, there should 
be greater ex ante scrutiny of board-adopted bylaws. In failing to recognize 
this underlying principle, the ATP Tour court claimed to apply Boilermakers 
but in fact adopted a much more rigid rule. 
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEE-SHARING INTO FEE-SHIFTING 
If current fee-shifting proposals overreach as a result of focusing on the 
effect of excessive litigation rather than its cause, the question of what has 
caused the current crisis in shareholder litigation remains, along with the ques-
tion of how to fix it. This Part argues that the fundamental cause of the current 
crisis is the misinterpretation and resulting misapplication of the corporate 
benefit doctrine. This doctrinal error transformed a principle of fee-sharing 
into a rule of fee-shifting—that is, the Delaware Rule, under which the corpo-
ration always pays. The Delaware Rule, in turn, has given rise to the present 
crisis in shareholder litigation. Section A below probes the origins of the cor-
porate benefit doctrine.195 Section B shows precisely where and how judicial 
interpretation led the doctrine astray.196 Section C then reviews and analyzes 
the implications of the transformation.197 A concrete set of proposals for fixing 
the problem is offered in the Part that follows. 
A. Fee-Sharing: The Common Benefit and Common Fund Doctrines 
The doctrinal confusion surrounding fee-shifting has its origins in the an-
cient division between courts of law and courts of equity. In English courts of 
law, the cost of litigation, including attorneys’ fees, was borne by the losing 
party—the so-called English Rule referred to above.198 In English courts of 
equity, by contrast, the chancellor had jurisdiction over funds and estates in 
which multiple actual or potential claimants held a common interest and there-
fore regularly charged fees back to the estate when a claimant increased or pro-
tected the value of the estate for the benefit of all.199 Courts of equity, in other 
words, applied a doctrine of fee-sharing, not fee-shifting. 
In spite of famously declining to follow English doctrine on fee-shifting, 
American courts did adopt the practice of English courts of equity in ordering 
the sharing of fees among all beneficiaries of a fund recovered for the “com-
                                                                                                                           
 195 See infra notes 198–219 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 220–238 and accompanying text. 
 197 See infra notes 239–252 and accompanying text. 
 198 Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851–54 (1929); Charles T. McCormick, Coun-
sel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 619–20 
(1931). 
 199 Goodhart, supra note 198, at 854. 
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mon benefit.”200 The leading American authority on the common benefit doc-
trine is a U.S. Supreme Court opinion from 1881, Trustees v. Greenough.201 In 
that case, a bondholder successfully sued to rescind a fraudulent conveyance of 
railroad company assets. The trial court ordered the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees 
to be paid out of the funds recovered, and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
award on appeal, treating the plaintiff as a quasi-trustee, the denial of whose 
expenses would unjustly enrich others benefited by his efforts.202 In the Court’s 
words: 
[Failure to award fees and expenses] would not only be unjust to 
him, but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate in 
the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage. He has worked for 
them as well as for himself; and if he cannot be reimbursed out of 
the fund itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the 
expenses which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon 
the fund is the most equitable way of securing such contribution.203 
The Court’s rationale thus firmly grounded what became known as the 
“Greenough rule” in equity, specifically trust, in which parties recovering 
funds for a trust estate are entitled to reimbursement either out of the funds 
recovered or “by a proportional contribution from those who accept the benefit 
of his efforts.”204 The Greenough rule was widely accepted and applied by 
state as well as federal courts.205 
Because the Greenough rule awarded fees only when the action increased 
or protected the value of funds common to all members of the class,206 it came 
to be known alternatively as the “common fund” doctrine.207 Monetary recov-
ery was important because, as noted above, the rule permitted fee-sharing, not 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See generally John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974) (analyzing the “uncertain and conflicting policies” behind the Ameri-
can approach to awarding attorneys’ fees); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule 
on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984) (analyzing the history of the American 
rule and shifts in attitude towards its application). 
 201 105 U.S. 527, 538 (1881). 
 202 Id. at 531–33. 
 203 Id. at 532. 
 204 Id. at 533 (citing precedent, starting with English Courts of Equity). 
 205 See generally Allowance of Attorney's Fee Against Property or Fund Increased or Protected 
by Attorney's Services, 49 ALR 1149 (1927), supplemented by 107 ALR 749 (1937) (providing histor-
ical context for the Rule and listing cases applying it). 
 206 Plaintiffs, however, need not have been organized into a formal class action. Hornstein, supra 
note 52, at 665–75 (categorizing cases involving common fund recoveries as either “true,” “hybrid,” 
or “spurious” class actions). 
 207 See e.g., Dawson, supra note 200, at 1601 (“The ‘common fund’ as a source of counsel fees 
has been created . . . by the United States Supreme Court [in Greenough].”). This Article therefore 
uses the terms “Greenough rule,” “common benefit doctrine,” and “common fund doctrine” inter-
changeably. 
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fee-shifting. Because funds recovered are an asset of the plaintiff class, fees 
paid from recovered funds are paid by plaintiffs, not the defendant.208 When 
funds are not recovered (or the value of funds held in trust is not otherwise 
increased by the action), then the only means of recovering plaintiffs’ fees un-
der a doctrine of fee-sharing would by means of a pro rata assessment on each 
member of the benefiting class.209 Historically, parties did not press and courts 
did not award recoveries on this basis, but rather confined the reach of the 
Greenough rule to a share of funds recovered. 
The Greenough rule was first applied to shareholder litigation in the con-
text of derivative suits. The early cases treated the derivative suit as a straight-
forward application of the common fund principle, which indeed it was, as 
long as monetary relief was recovered.210 Monetary relief was typical, and at-
torneys’ fees were measured as a percentage of the recovery.211 
The derivative suit, however, began to push at the limits of the Greenough 
rule when it resulted in non-pecuniary relief.212 Some awards of non-pecuniary 
relief—such as, for example, the avoidance of a conflict-of-interest transaction 
or the cancellation of a harmful ultra vires act213—could be squared with the 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder’s Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. 
REV. 784, 786 (1939) (“[In common fund cases,] the successful litigant’s lawyers are not being paid 
by the unsuccessful party, but by the class of which the successful litigant is a member, which would 
have had to pay these expenses had it brought the action itself.”); Robert A. Smith, Recovery of Plain-
tiff’s Attorney’s Fees in Corporate Litigation, 40 L.A. B. BULL. 15, 17 (1964) (“[U]nder the equitable 
fund doctrine, the award of attorney’s fees is against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not obtain a personal 
judgment against the defendant or defendants for attorney’s fees.” (citations omitted)). 
 209 Hornstein, supra note 208, at 789 (framing the claim to fees as “a claim by the attorney 
against the class”). 
 210 Id. at 799 (reporting the results of a survey of fifty-four American cases from the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries and finding that attorneys’ fees were awarded “if the suit is deriv-
ative and the corporation benefits, whether the suit results in (1) money damages; or (2) cancellation 
of an improper transaction, or the setting aside of a fraudulent conveyance”). The allegations in these 
suits overwhelmingly involved inadequate compensation in sales of corporate stock or assets, exces-
sive executive compensation, and outright looting. Id. at 797. Underscoring the pecuniary nature of 
the relief involved in these suits, counsel fees were frequently measured against the percentage of the 
benefit returned to the corporation and were often in the range of twenty to thirty-five percent. 
 211 Id. at 813–14 (compiling cases); see Hornstein, supra note 54, at 586–87 (updating prior study 
with fifteen additional observations showing consistent results); see also George D. Hornstein, New 
Aspects of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1947) (further updating prior 
study with additional observations showing generally consistent results). 
 212 See Hornstein, supra note 52, at 667–70 (citing cases where counsel fees were awarded in 
derivatives suits notwithstanding the lack of a common fund); Smith, supra note 208, at 17–18. 
 213 See, e.g., Greenough v. Coeur D’Alenes Lead Co., 18 P.2d 288, 289 (Idaho 1932) (awarding 
counsel fees in shareholder suit resulting in cancellation of an unauthorized sale of corporate shares to 
a member of the board of directors); Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492, 495–97 (Sup. 
Ct. 1949) (awarding counsel fees in shareholder suit to set aside an ultra vires act of the corporation); 
Baker v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 112 P. 647, 651 (Wash. 1911) (awarding counsel fees in share-
holder suit resulting in a cancellation of sale and return of a valuable asset to the corporation). Alt-
hough these cases do not result in the creation of a “common fund,” the benefit is pecuniary in nature 
and therefore easily measured by reference to the transaction cancelled or the funds protected. See, 
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common benefit doctrine in spite of not creating a separate fund because such 
awards had a clear monetary impact on the value of the firm.214 Not all awards 
of non-pecuniary relief, however, were so easy to square with doctrine—for 
example, relief resulting in clarification of election procedures or the interpre-
tation of bylaws. There was no clear authority under Greenough to award fees 
in derivative suits resulting in non-pecuniary relief with no clear monetary im-
pact on the value of the firm. 
Courts solved this problem with a doctrinal innovation that was grounded 
in the procedural peculiarities of the derivative suit. In derivative suits, alt-
hough the corporation is listed as a nominal defendant, the corporation in fact 
serves as the plaintiff, bringing suit against those officers or directors that have 
harmed it.215 That the shareholders have merely brought the claim on the cor-
poration’s behalf is reflected by the fact that any recovery ultimately won in 
the litigation is paid to the corporation, not the shareholders.216 Because, in 
derivative suits, the plaintiff is the corporation, fees and expenses paid by the 
corporation are paid by the plaintiff. Hence, an award of attorneys’ fees in a 
derivative suit, regardless of whether the relief is pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
in nature, is in fact paid by the plaintiff, consistent with the fee-sharing princi-
ple in Greenough. This was the reasoning followed in 1960 by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in the leading case of Bosch v. Meeker Co-Op Light & Power, 
which held: 
Since the corporation is the beneficiary of the recovery of funds or 
of the corrective benefit of the action, it should stand the expense of 
it. It should further be conceded that there may be stockholder’s ac-
                                                                                                                           
e.g., Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 265 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1954) (measuring an award of attorneys’ fees 
against the value of the fund protected). As a result, such cases fall within the original meaning and 
intent of Greenough, however, which allowed for relief not only for the recovery but also the protec-
tion of common funds. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 200, at 1614–25 (describing different means of 
creating funds consistent with Greenough). 
 214 Such awards were consistent with the equitable origins of fee-sharing in increasing or protect-
ing the value of a common fund. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164–65 
(Del. 1989) (citing CM & M Grp., Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 795 (Del. Super. 1982)) (“Typically, 
successful derivative or class action suits which result in the recovery of money or property wrongful-
ly diverted from the corporation, or which result in the imposition of changes in internal operating 
procedures that are designed to produce such monetary savings in the future, are viewed as fund-
creating actions.”). As a result of this reasoning, early commentators were generally untroubled by the 
award of fees in this context. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 211, 13–16 (including several such cases 
in his survey of derivative suits). 
 215 In a derivative suit, the corporation plays both roles, but at different times. In the first part of 
the derivative suit, where the stockholder sues the corporation to sue, the corporation is the nominal 
defendant. In the second part of the derivative suit, the suit for relief, the corporation is the plaintiff. 
Thus with regard to the ultimate relief paid in connection with the suit—relief that is paid as a result 
of claims asserted in the second part of the suit, not the first—the corporation is the plaintiff. See su-
pra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 216 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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tions which do not result in the creation of cash funds or in the pro-
tection or conservation of corporate assets, but which nevertheless 
result in a correction or straightening out of corporate affairs, so as 
to provide a substantial benefit which will warrant recovery of costs 
and attorneys’ fees.217 
The Bosch court’s innovation came to be known, of course, as the “corporate 
benefit” doctrine.218 This doctrine was understood by courts adopting it as a 
corollary to the “common fund” doctrine, fully consistent with the Greenough 
rule.219 Consistency with Greenough, however, depends upon the procedural 
peculiarities of the derivative suit in which the corporation against which at-
torneys’ fees are ultimately assessed functions, in fact, as the plaintiff. It is in 
this context alone that corporate benefit remains true to its origins as a doctrine 
of fee-sharing, not fee-shifting. 
B. Fee-Shifting: Corporate Benefit Outgrows the Confines  
of the Derivative Suit 
Now, fifty years after Bosch, the “corporate benefit” doctrine has been 
widely, if not uniformly, adopted by state and federal courts in the United 
States.220 Unfortunately, these courts have not always attended to the origins of 
the doctrine and thus have often applied it beyond the traditional confines of 
the derivative suit. The doctrine has, for example, become an essential element 
in the settlement of shareholder class actions, driving the current boom in mer-
ger litigation.221 The use of corporate benefit to award fees in this context is 
not justified by the origins of the doctrine. This is not a mere peccadillo. When 
a court applies corporate benefit outside of the derivative suit context, its order 
no longer effects a sharing of costs and fees among plaintiffs, but rather a 
                                                                                                                           
 217 Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass’n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 1960). Further 
clarifying the doctrine, the Bosch court stated: 
In the face of unwise, arbitrary, or unreasonable ultra vires acts or conduct of corporate of-
ficers which would be harmful to the interests of the corporation, a stockholder should be 
permitted to prosecute a suit to redress a wrong or prevent a threatened wrong to his cor-
poration even though such action might not result in “pecuniary benefit.” 
Id. 
 218 See supra notes 119–132 and accompanying text (describing how this doctrine is currently 
applied in shareholder litigation). 
 219 See, e.g., Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152 (Ct. App. 1968) (“the substantial-
benefit doctrine is an extension of the common-fund doctrine”). 
 220 Forty states expressly recognize a plaintiffs’ right to attorneys’ fees in cases involving pecuni-
ary relief. Fourteen states expressly recognize a right to fees under corporate benefit in the context of 
non-pecuniary relief. Seven have an express statement against it. The remainder are unclear. 
 221 See supra notes 119–132 and accompanying text; see also Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manu-
script at 8–9) (“The key to plaintiffs’ counsel recovering fees [in merger litigation] is the portrayal of 
the settlement relief as a corporate benefit.”). 
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shifting of costs and fees to the defendant, something courts typically are 
loathe to do in the absence of express statutory authorization.222 
Delaware’s use of the corporate benefit doctrine predates Bosch. For ex-
ample, the 1958 Court of Chancery decision in Saks v. Gamble awarded fees in 
a derivative suit on the basis of a disclosure clarifying the ownership of a cor-
porate asset, a benefit, the court said, that “cannot be directly measured in dol-
lars and cents” but that nevertheless “was of sufficient value to justify the al-
lowance of reasonable fees.”223 Although the courts in such cases clearly rec-
ognized that they were operating under an exception to the American Rule, the 
early decisions failed to delineate either the basis or the bounds of the excep-
tion. For example, the 1953 Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Maurer v. 
International Re-Insurance Corp., widely cited for enumerating the recognized 
exceptions to the American Rule, did not include the corporate benefit theory 
on the list.224 In this environment of doctrinal instability, judicial opinions 
combined claims and mixed theories so that a resulting award ultimately might 
derive from a more established theory, typically the common fund doctrine.225 
Those rare cases where corporate benefit was the only possible basis for a fee 
award usually were derivative suits.226 But not always. 
                                                                                                                           
 222 U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has held that: 
[federal] courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of 
attorneys’ fees . . . or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which 
they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depending upon the courts’ 
assessment of the importance of the public policies involved in particular cases. 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975); see Dover Historical 
Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1091 (Del. 2006) (“Historically, our 
courts have been cautious about creating and expanding judge-made exceptions to the American Rule 
absent express and clear legislative guidance. [The present case] clearly created a social benefit. But, 
that benefit is not of the kind that justifies creating a new judge-made exception to the American 
Rule.”). 
 223 154 A.2d 767, 770 (Del. Ch. 1958). 
 224 95 A.2d 827, 830–31 (Del. 1953) (listing suits recovering a common fund, trustees seeking 
instructions concerning the administration of a trust or estate, interpleader suits, and court appointed 
counsel to advocate an issue no litigant will address); see Mencher v. Sachs, 164 A.2d 320, 322 (Del. 
1960) (citing Maurer for the proposition that “[t]here can be no doubt of the ‘jurisdiction’ of equity to 
award counsel fees as costs in a proper case” while also asserting that the absence of a theory from the 
Maurer list does necessarily imply a proffered theory is improper); Richman v. DeVal Aerodynamics, 
Inc., 185 A.2d 884, 885 (Del. Ch. 1962) (citing Maurer as authority to award fees in suit resulting in 
non-pecuniary relief, a situation not contemplated in Maurer). 
 225 Mencher, 164 A.2d at 322 (combining a direct claim to compel a stockholders’ meeting with a 
derivative claim to cancel illegally issued shares and awarding fees for an benefit that had “no dollar 
basis” in spite of the fact that the relief—the cancellation of illegally issued shares and the termination 
of a harmful contract—would have been cognizable under the common fund doctrine); Lewis v. Great 
United W. Corp., No. 5397, 1978 WL 2490 at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 1978) (awarding fees in case 
mixing class and derivative claims on the basis of the common fund doctrine). 
 226 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386 (Del. Ch. 1966); Saks, 154 A.2d at 770. 
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In the 1962 Court of Chancery decision in Richman v. DeVal, an individu-
al plaintiff petitioned the court for an award of attorneys’ fees after successful-
ly suing, in the midst of a battle for corporate control, to force the corporation 
to convene a special shareholder meeting.227 The corporation contested the fee 
request, arguing that the plaintiff had acted in his individual capacity to further 
his own interest in seeking to “capture the control of DeVal.”228 Rejecting this 
as a basis to deny fees, the Court of Chancery asserted “where a basis in law 
for recovery of fees is established, the characterization of a suit as derivative or 
representative is immaterial, the assets of the corporation being a fund belong-
ing to the stockholders in common.”229 The court declined to affirm the plain-
tiffs’ broader contention that “wherever a legal suit is successful in permitting 
the whole body of stockholders to take some ‘corporate action,’ then the suit 
itself must be characterized as a class action and the corporation charged with 
the costs of the litigation,” implying that this formulation likely overstated the 
rule.230 Leaving the precise contours of the rule for another day, however, the 
court held merely that plaintiffs had created sufficient benefit in the present 
case to support an award of fees.231 The Richman court thus ordered the corpo-
rate defendant to pay a non-derivative plaintiff’s litigation fees on the basis of 
a non-pecuniary corporate benefit. 
The modern source of the corporate benefit doctrine, the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s 1989 decision in Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, arose in a 
similar context and came to a similar result.232 After rebuffing a significant 
blockholder’s unsolicited offer to acquire control, Tandycrafts began to cam-
paign for a supermajority charter amendment to be voted upon at an upcoming 
shareholders’ meeting. When the blockholder sued on the basis of misleading 
statements in the company’s proxy concerning the supermajority voting re-
quirement, Tandycrafts corrected its proxy but ultimately lost the vote.233 After 
the meeting, the blockholder filed a request for attorneys’ fees on the basis of 
the benefit created by the corrective disclosure in the proxy. The Chancery 
Court awarded fees, and Tandycrafts appealed. 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Tandycrafts’ argument 
that fees could not be awarded because the blockholder had acted in an indi-
                                                                                                                           
 227 See 185 A.2d at 885. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. (citing Mencher, 164 A.2d 320). 
 230 Id. at 886. 
 231 Id. (“[T]his is not a case involving solely a demand for the calling of a stockholders’ meeting. 
It also embraced an attack on proposed action by the directors which at least a majority in interest of 
the stockholders considered to be detrimental to the corporation generally.”). 
 232 562 A.2d at 1167. 
 233 Specifically, the proxy failed to disclose that the combined holdings of the company’s em-
ployee benefits plan (10.9%) and shares held by management (7.5%) made a non-management spon-
sored takeover realistically impossible. Id. at 1163. 
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vidual capacity—that is, the suit was neither a derivative suit, nor a sharehold-
er class action.234 Instead, the court emphasized that the relevant inquiry in a 
fee award is “not the status of the plaintiff but the nature of the corporate or 
class benefit.”235 Recognizing the benefit of the corrective disclosure in this 
case, the court again emphasized that “the form of the suit is not a deciding 
factor” and ultimately shifted fees to the corporate defendant.236 
In so holding, of course, the court was making new law. Prior interpreta-
tions of the corporate benefit doctrine grounded it in derivative suits so that it 
could still be understood as an assessment of fees against plaintiffs, rather than 
defendants—that is, fee-sharing rather than fee-shifting. In cutting the strings 
tying the doctrine to its derivative suit origins, Tandycrafts essentially created a 
new exception to the American rule, allowing fee-shifting where previously 
there had only been fee-sharing.237 The court did not offer a doctrinal founda-
tion for the new exception, nor did it seriously consider the consequences, 
leaving it to the Court of Chancery to police abuse.238 
C. Implications of the Doctrinal Transformation 
In spite of the unfortunate assertions of the Court of Chancery in Rich-
man239 and the Supreme Court in Tandycrafts,240 there is a significant difference 
between whether an action is brought as a derivative suit, on the one hand, or as 
an individual or class action, on the other.241 Most obviously, the derivative suit 
subjects the complaint to a panoply of procedural obstacles—the demand re-
quirement, susceptibility to dismissal by a special litigation committee, and in 
some jurisdictions, a requirement that plaintiffs post a bond for defense costs—
all of which are designed to deter excessive litigation.242 By limiting fee awards 
                                                                                                                           
 234 Id. at 1165. 
 235 Id. at 1166. 
 236 Id. (quoting Reiser v. Del Monte Prop. Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 237 The Tandycrafts court used the phrase “fee-shifting” as have most courts since. Tandycrafts, 
562 A.2d at 1164, 1166; In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353, 360 
(Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom. First Interstate Bancorp v. Williamson, 755 A.2d 388 (Del. 2000). 
 238 Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1166. The Court of Chancery has subsequently qualified the rights of 
bidders to seek attorneys’ fees in litigation connected to takeover fights but has not otherwise dis-
turbed the breadth of the Tandycrafts holding. In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 
10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 23, 1990) (“[The bidder] has no obvious reason to try to 
‘maximize shareholder value.’ Indeed, its interest, if successful, will minimize shareholder value. 
Stockholders, on the other hand, do not care if the bidder gets a ‘good deal,’ they want the most com-
pensation available for their holding in the company.”). 
 239 Richman, 185 A.2d at 885 (“[W]here a basis in law for recovery of fees is established, the 
characterization of a suit as derivative or representative is immaterial . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 240 Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1166 (stating that whether to award fees depends “not [on] the status 
of the plaintiff  but [on] the nature of the corporate or class benefit” (emphasis added)). 
 241 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 48, § 13.10 (“Whether an action is characterized as indi-
vidual, class, or derivative can have significant consequences.”). 
 242 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
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for non-pecuniary relief to the derivative suit context, the original corporate ben-
efit doctrine thus contained built-in mechanisms to prevent abuse.243 Further 
mechanisms also have been suggested to constrain the abuse of non-pecuniary 
relief in the derivative suit context.244 Class actions are presently subject to none 
of these constraints.245 
Nor, of course, are individual suits. Why then has the extension of the 
corporate benefit doctrine in Tandycrafts not led to a similar explosion of fil-
ings of individual as opposed to class actions? Although a partial answer to 
this question may be found in the subsequent denial of attorneys’ fees for indi-
vidual litigants in takeover cases, the context in which individual litigants are 
most likely to arise,246 a fuller explanation is suggested by the dynamics of 
shareholder litigation explored above.247 The litigation release is what makes 
defendants settle, and defendants seek the widest possible litigation release. 
However, litigation releases can bind absent parties only when entered as a 
judicial order in class or derivative litigation. Therefore, although Tandycrafts 
permits plaintiffs’ lawyers to have their fees paid for individual actions, be-
cause defendants will settle on a class basis or not at all, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
working under a contingency arrangement have no incentive to represent indi-
vidual litigants.248 Hence the absence of individual actions and the prolifera-
tion of shareholder class actions. 
                                                                                                                           
 243 On the susceptibility of awarding fees for non-pecuniary relief to abuse, see Schechtman v. 
Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957) (“[T]here should be some check on derivative actions lest 
they be purely strike suits of great nuisance and no affirmative good, and hence it is ruled generally 
that the benefit to the corporation and the general body of shareholders must be substantial.”). 
 244 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 (1994) (requiring that “in no event should the attorney’s fee award ex-
ceed a reasonable proportion of the value of the relief (including nonpecuniary relief) obtained by the 
plaintiff for the corporation”). The Commentary to § 7.17 makes it clear that although intangible relief 
may be a basis for attorneys’ fees under this rule, the intangible relief must “be susceptible to suffi-
cient valuation as to permit the courts to relate the fee award to it.” Id. § 7.17 cmt. (a). The commen-
tary also urges judges reviewing settlements to be especially suspicious of any “settlement in which 
the defendants’ cash contribution just equals or exceeds the requested award of attorneys’ fees.” Id. 
§ 7.17 cmt. (d). 
 245 The class action is subject to its own procedural requirements, of course, including for exam-
ple, numerosity, commonality, typicality, the fairness and adequacy of the class representative, and 
predominance of common questions of law or fact. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a)–(b). However, these 
essentially reflect the definition of a class action, not substantive rules designed to deter excessive 
class action litigation such as, in the federal context, the pleading requirements and discovery stay 
contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA applies only to federal 
securities class actions, not shareholder class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty under state law. 
Id. 
 246 On the carve-out of fee awards in the takeover context, see supra note 238. On the likelihood 
of individual litigants arising in the takeover context, see infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text. 
 247 See supra notes 88–107 and accompanying text. 
 248 Additionally, because fees are awarded in relation to the size of the benefit, a lawyer repre-
senting an individual litigant may be seen to create a smaller benefit (the benefit to the individual 
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Finally, it is simply not the case, as suggested in Richman, that assessing 
fees against the corporation in a class action is equivalent to assessing fees 
against the corporation in a derivative suit.249 Fees are not assessed against 
corporations in the derivative suit context as a matter of administrative conven-
ience but rather as a reflection of the fact that, in that context alone, the corpo-
ration is the plaintiff.250 Furthermore, as a policy matter, the justification for 
awarding fees for therapeutic derivative suit settlements is that the therapeutics 
increase the long term value of the corporation.251 This justification cannot 
apply to merger class actions because in that context there is no long term. Ra-
ther, the change of control transaction that is the basis of the plaintiffs’ suit 
puts the corporation in a “last period” scenario, triggering duties to maximize 
the immediate short term value of the firm.252 Non-pecuniary relief in this con-
text does not increase firm value. It diminishes it by the amount paid in litiga-
tion costs and attorneys’ fees, an amount often referred to as the “deal tax.” 
Assessing attorneys’ fees against the corporation for non-pecuniary relief in the 
context of merger class actions therefore destroys firm value whereas, in the 
derivative suit context, such relief enhances it. 
Fee-sharing, the original position of the Greenough rule and the common 
fund doctrine, is not the same as fee-shifting. By failing to recognize this dis-
tinction, the Tandycrafts court inadvertently departed from both the American 
and English Rules on fees, creating instead the Delaware Rule, under which 
the corporation always pays. The Delaware Rule is the cause of the current 
crisis in shareholder litigation, fueling vast quantities of non-meritorious 
claims. The question, then, is what to do about it. That is the subject of the next 
Part. 
IV. A PROGRAM OF REFORM 
This Article has argued that the current generation of fee-shifting bylaws 
is not an acceptable means of responding to the crisis in shareholder litigation 
and ought therefore to be invalidated by the Delaware courts.253 But what 
then? Returning to the status quo prior to ATP Tour leaves the fundamental 
public policy concerns unaddressed and the very problem that has led corpora-
                                                                                                                           
rather than the benefit to the class) and therefore be entitled to a smaller fee. See supra note 133 and 
accompanying text. 
 249 185 A.2d at 885 (justifying the fee award because “the assets of the corporation [are] a fund 
belonging to the stockholders in common”). 
 250 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 251 Hornstein, supra note 52, at 662–63. 
 252 See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003) (discussing the role of the last period problem in animating Delaware 
takeover jurisprudence); Laster, supra note 76 (employing the last period problem to critique the cur-
rent doctrine of “enhanced scrutiny”). 
 253 See supra notes 157–165 and accompanying text. 
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tions to adopt fee-shifting bylaws unchanged. If Delaware is to take its role as 
the national corporate law leader seriously, it not only must invalidate fee-
shifting bylaws, it also must offer a realistic solution to the problem of exces-
sive shareholder litigation. This Article has identified the cause of the current 
crisis as the misapplication of the corporate benefit doctrine resulting in a sys-
tem that shifts the full cost of intra-corporate litigation to corporate defendants. 
The right way to fix what is presently wrong with shareholder litigation there-
fore is to reform the doctrine of corporate benefit. 
The remainder of this Article proposes three corrections to current theory 
and practice involving corporate benefit. First, corporate benefit should not be 
recognized as a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions.254 Second, 
in cases where corporate benefit is recognized, courts should conduct a more 
rigorous inquiry into how the benefit was created.255 Third, courts should 
weigh the benefit received by the shareholder plaintiffs against the breadth of 
the litigation release received by the corporate defendant, tailoring the scope of 
the release to the benefit received to guard against the overbroad release of 
claims.256 The sections that follow explore these policy proposals in greater 
detail. Finally, this Part closes by considering how best to enact this package of 
reforms.257 
A. No Corporate Benefit for Non-Pecuniary Relief in  
Shareholder Class Actions 
Corporate benefit should be returned to its doctrinal origins—the deriva-
tive suit—and no longer recognized as a justification for fee awards in the 
class action context.258 Plaintiffs, of course, could continue to bring suits on a 
class basis and, if they recovered monetary relief, still could recover attorneys’ 
fees on the basis of the common fund doctrine.259 Outside of the derivative suit 
context, however, they could not recover attorneys’ fees on the basis of non-
pecuniary relief. As a result, plaintiffs would no longer pursue claims that 
could only result in non-monetary recoveries. 
Unlike fee-shifting bylaws, this rule would install an effective filter to 
screen good claims from bad. The filter would operate on the basis of the 
plaintiffs’ knowledge about the value of their claim, thereby circumventing the 
information asymmetries that make it difficult for courts to judge the underly-
                                                                                                                           
 254 See infra notes 258–282 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 283–294 and accompanying text. 
 256 See infra notes 295–302 and accompanying text. 
 257 See infra notes 303–311 and accompanying text. 
 258 Returning to doctrinal origins would also disallow the theory as a basis for recovery in indi-
vidual actions. Individual actions, however, do not present the same problem as class actions. See 
supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 259 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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ing merits of claims at settlement.260 Claimants with high value claims—those 
that have some chance of resulting in monetary relief—will bring them. 
Claimants with low value claims—those that otherwise would result in disclo-
sure-only settlements or other forms of non-pecuniary relief—either will not 
file them or will abandon them once they are revealed to lack a plausible basis 
for recovery.261 The potential to recover fees (or not) thus will drive the advo-
cates themselves—that is, those with the most knowledge concerning the ex-
pected value of the underlying claim—to sort good claims from bad ones. 
The most obvious practical consequence of this sorting mechanism would 
be the elimination of disclosure-only settlements. This would present an im-
mediate and substantial reduction in the amount of wasteful litigation without 
any meaningful loss of shareholder protection. Material misstatements in the 
proxy could, after all, still be litigated under federal securities law.262 Indeed, 
keeping such claims alive by preventing the lawyers from trading a broad re-
lease for a meaningless disclosure settlement is a benefit of the rule.263 
A potentially more controversial consequence of the rule, however, would 
be the termination of amendment settlements, currently the second most com-
mon outcome in merger litigation.264 As described above, amendment settle-
ments typically involve an adjustment to the merger agreement’s deal protec-
tion provisions—often a reduction in the termination fee or an extension of the 
Go-Shop or Window-Shop period.265 This may be a more objectionable conse-
quence because reducing the stringency of deal protections does, in theory at 
least, produce a potential benefit for the shareholders—it increases the likeli-
hood of a topping bid. This reasoning is reflected in the leading Delaware case 
on amendment settlements, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2011 opinion in 
In re Compellent Technologies, Inc. Shareholders’ Litigation, which not only 
recognized the benefit of such settlements but also suggested a formula for 
valuing them based upon the probability and magnitude of an overbid.266 Be-
                                                                                                                           
 260 See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 261 One problem is that claimants might not always know at the time of filing whether a claim is 
high or low value, a determination that may require some amount of litigation. The rule proposed by 
this Article would allow claimants to file and pursue investigative efforts, but should the investigation 
fail to uncover a significant basis for relief, it also creates an incentive for the claimants to drop the 
claim. Compare this outcome to fee-shifting bylaws, which discourage all claims from being brought 
in the first place. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 262 See Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 31–32) (making this argument). 
 263 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of disclosure settlements to 
release federal securities law claims). 
 264 Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 20). 
 265 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 266 No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011). The formula applied to 
determine the attorneys’ fees was first suggested by Vice Chancellor Laster, as dicta, in Del Monte. 
See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027–VCL, 2011 WL 2535256, at *16 (Del. Ch. 
June 27, 2011) (noting that “the value of the benefit [from a reduction in deal protections] does not 
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cause the rule advocated here would deny fee recoveries for such settlements, 
one might object that it will lead to overly protected deals and a concomitant 
decrease in topping bids. 
This, however, is unlikely to be the case. First, as an empirical matter, 
overbids rarely occur in connection with amendment settlements,267 and evi-
dence suggests that shareholders do not place much value on such settle-
ments.268 Moreover, commentators have suggested that were disclosure-only 
settlements suddenly to go away, the problem of non-meritorious claims and 
low value settlements would simply migrate to the amendment context.269 
Compellent, although based on sensible first principles, will not solve this 
problem any more than Sauer-Danfoss solved it in the context of disclosure-
only settlements.270 
The rule advanced here would not award plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees on a 
probability basis. It would demand actual benefit. Thus, if a reduction in deal 
protections caused by plaintiffs’ efforts did in fact result in an overbid, plain-
tiffs’ attorneys would stand to recover handsomely under the common fund 
doctrine.271 Returning to the common fund theory in this context also provides 
a clear metric for valuing the relief obtained by plaintiffs,272 sparing courts the 
mental gymnastics required to arrive at a value for non-pecuniary relief.273 
                                                                                                                           
depend on an actual topping bid. Pricing the benefit requires two inputs: (i) the overall likelihood of a 
topping bid and (ii) the incremental gain that the likely topping bid would have created”). 
 267 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 61, at 4; Daines & Koumrian, supra note 84, at 6–8. 
 268 Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 15–16) (finding that amendment settlements have 
minimal effect on shareholder voting). 
 269 See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti et al., Valuing Therapeutic Benefits for an Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees Post-In re Compellent Technologies Shareholder Litigation, 17 M&A LAW. 1, 10 (2013) (argu-
ing that the generous award of attorneys’ fees for deal protection amendments “contains opportunities 
for mischief and unwholesome windfalls”); see also Fisch et al., supra note 6 (manuscript at 44–46) 
(discussing this possibility but also identifying countervailing factors). 
 270 See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. Indeed, the reasoning in Compellent will 
likely make the problem worse since the averages used to determine the probability and magnitude of 
an overbid mask a number of complexities, including market-specific factors and firm-specific factors, 
that will leave such matters open to significant contestation. The susceptibility of this supposedly 
more stringent standard to manipulation and abuse recalls the problems of the securities class action 
and the cottage industry that has sprung up around it for financial economists, an industry the courts 
have been unwilling to tame despite several recent tries. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005). 
 271 It may be sensible, in this context at least, to be considerably more generous in the amount of 
attorneys’ fees awarded when a claim is successful. More generous fee awards not only recognize the 
fact that there is a significant contingency here that had not existed before—that is, the possibility that 
the attorneys’ fees will not in fact be paid—it also accords with the standard economic account of 
damages multipliers, according to which large damage awards make sense both because they incentiv-
ize private law enforcement and because they increase deterrence. See generally Louis Kaplow, Shift-
ing Plaintiffs’ Fees Versus Increasing Damage Awards, 24 RAND. J. ECON. 625 (1993) (arguing that 
higher damage awards are more efficient than shifting plaintiffs’ fees). 
 272 See Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc., 72 Cal Rptr. 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1968) (citing Beyerbach v. 
Juno Oil Co., 265 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1954)) (“[A]n award of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff may 
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Furthermore, taking away amendment settlements will not cause deal pro-
tections to go unpoliced. Even if shareholder class actions challenging deal 
protections were to disappear altogether,274 suits challenging excessive deal 
protections would still be brought by the intervening bidders themselves.275 As 
described by the Court of Chancery: “Bidders, unlike the stockholders . . . are 
not organizationally disadvantaged. Indeed, the typical bidder is a well-
organized and well-financed individual or small group of individual stockhold-
ers. They usually have vast resources that may be tapped to fund lawsuits nec-
essary to advance their investment strategy.”276 Intervening bidders often sue 
to challenge deal protections, and their suits are often successful.277 These suits 
create significant positive externalities for all shareholders by forcing open 
defensive devices, thereby making an active bidding contest for the company 
more likely. As a result, under the rule proposed by this Article, although deal 
protections will not attract litigation in every case, leading to a plethora of low-
                                                                                                                           
properly be measured by, and paid from, a common fund where his derivative action . . . has recov-
ered or protected a fund in fact. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 273 See Transcript at 92–93, In re CapitalSource Inc. Stockholder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 8765-
CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Compellent may give a false sense of mathematical certainty but fun-
damentally [it] relies on a great amount of judgment by the Court.”). Entering ungrounded, highly 
contestable rulings—on such matters as the value of corporate disclosures or other non-pecuniary 
relief—risks making courts appear results-oriented, which in turn can raise doubts concerning the 
independence of the judiciary. This is the reason Delaware courts have long sought to avoid being 
seen as “super directors.” See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“To rule other-
wise would invite courts to become super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decision-
making and executive compensation.”); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 
1989 WL 7036, at *14 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“To recognize in courts a residual power to 
review the substance of business decisions for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where 
those decisions are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to 
make of courts super-directors.”). 
 274 This seems unlikely. It may still be worth the plaintiffs’ attorney’s investment to challenge 
deal protections in those cases where an intervening bidder seems especially likely, thereby preserving 
the opportunity to claim credit for the overbid should it arise. This set of incentives resembles the 
dynamic discussed above in the context of controlling shareholder cases. See supra notes 64–74 and 
accompanying text. The potential for such free-riding is addressed by the second reform, discussed 
below. See infra notes 283–294 and accompanying text. 
 275 The ability of an intervening bidder as such to sue on the basis of fiduciary duty is unclear. 
See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1174 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding Omnica-
re’s status as a bidder did not confer standing to assert breach of fiduciary duty claims). But see J. 
Travis Laster, The Line Item Veto and Unocal: Can a Bidder Qua Bidder Pursue Unocal Claims 
Against a Target Corporation’s Board of Directors?, 53 BUS. LAW. 767, 797 (1998) (marshaling 
doctrinal support for a bidder-standing rule). However, intervening bidders are likely also to be share-
holders with standing to sue on that basis. 
 276 In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
July 23, 1990). 
 277 See e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003); In re Topps 
Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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value settlements, they will be actively policed when they are most relevant—
that is, in overbid situations.278 
Are there other important shareholder rights, not relating to proxy disclo-
sures or deal protections, that might go unenforced if plaintiffs’ attorneys can 
no longer recover their fees in class action settlements? In considering this 
question, it is important to emphasize that the rule advocated here preserves 
the right of shareholder plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees for therapeutic set-
tlements of derivative suits.279 Leaving this avenue open recognizes the deriva-
tive suit as the original means of righting corporate wrongs and the therapeutic 
settlement as the basic tool for protecting shareholders prospectively from such 
harms.280 Any claim that can be pleaded as a derivative suit, as most actions 
                                                                                                                           
 278 Because they can sue to challenge deal protections, bidders can be expected to look through 
facially strong deal protections, understanding that only moderate deal protections will be enforceable. 
On this point, a comment of Vice Chancellor Noble is revealing: 
Omnicare may be read to say that there must be a fiduciary out in every merger agree-
ment . . . . Thus, hostile bidders are on notice that Delaware courts may not enforce a 
merger agreement that lacks a fiduciary out if they present a board with a superior offer. 
If, however, a merger agreement lacks a fiduciary out, and no better offer has emerged 
why should the Court enjoin the merger? To require that a fiduciary out clause be put in 
the merger agreement when sophisticated hostile bidders are on notice that the merger 
agreement may be found unenforceable if they submit a superior offer? Enjoining a 
merger when no superior offer has emerged is a perilous endeavor because there is al-
ways the possibility that the existing deal will vanish, denying shareholders the oppor-
tunity to accept any transaction. 
In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders’ Litig., No. CIV.A. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 n. 53. The 
most credible party to challenge a merger agreement is an intervening bidder. Should one fail to ap-
pear, however, it does not follow that they were deterred by the deal protections in the merger agree-
ment. Would-be bidders will be well advised on which provisions of a merger agreement are likely to 
be enforceable and which are not. See generally Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Specter of Omnica-
re, 38 J. CORP. L. 753, 767 (2012) (summarizing this line of reasoning by noting that “[n]o-out con-
tracts . . . are indeed voidable, but only by frustrated bidders, not by ordinary shareholder plaintiffs”). 
 279 In the transaction context, however, the continuous ownership rule will operate to extinguish 
derivative claims post-merger. See Arkansas Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin., 75 A.3d 888 
(Del. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs who exchange shares in connection with a merger transaction lose 
standing to pursue derivative claims, absent fraud or mere reorganization, by application of the con-
tinuous ownership requirement). Prominent commentators have argued that this aspect of the continu-
ous ownership requirement is bad policy generally. See generally Laster, supra note 55 (arguing that 
the contemporaneous ownership requirement for derivative actions is incoherent, unnecessary, and 
should be eliminated). At least this aspect of the requirement would have to be reconsidered if the 
derivative suit is to provide meaningful protection for shareholder rights in the transaction context. 
 280 Moreover, there are several recent examples of meaningful monetary recoveries in derivative 
suit settlements. See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, Freeport-McMoRan Nears Settlement Over McMoRan, 
Plains Deals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/freeport-
mcmoran-nears-settlement-over-mcmoran-plains-deals-1417379391, archived at https://perma.cc/8JYM-
RGZK?type=pdf (reporting on $100 million settlement of shareholder derivative suit relating to the 
purchase of two affiliate companies); Alison Frankel, Uglyduckling Shareholder Derivative Suits Are 
Poised for Swandom, REUTERS, Jan. 2, 2015, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/
2015/01/02/ugly-duckling-shareholder-derivative-suits-are-poised-for-swandom/, archived at http://
perma.cc/L5CX-7JND (noting positive recoveries in recent shareholder derivative suits, notably in-
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targeting corporate governance reforms can be, thus still could be settled for 
non-pecuniary relief.281 Those cases that cannot be pleaded as derivative 
suits—voting rights cases, for example—still may be brought by individual 
investors, especially activist investors pressing for board reforms or insurgents 
running a proxy fight. Here again, as in the context of bidder suits brought to 
invalidate excessive deal protections, dispersed shareholders enjoy a positive 
externality from such suits without suffering the cost of excessive litigation 
brought to create highly questionable shareholder value. The underlying intui-
tion here is that shareholders are likely better served by litigation brought by a 
real shareholder with a substantial economic stake in the outcome than by liti-
gation brought by contingency fee lawyers unaccountable to a genuine client. 
Finally, it bears noting that notwithstanding Delaware’s central im-
portance in the making of American corporate law, another state has already 
adopted the approach urged here. In 2013, in Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., the 
Texas Court of Appeals applied to shareholder suits a state statute barring fee 
recoveries for “coupon” settlements of class actions.282 As a result of Kazman, 
Texas no longer awards attorneys’ fees for non-pecuniary relief in shareholder 
class actions. Delaware should do the same. 
B. Rigorous Inquiry into the Cause of the Benefit 
In cases where some corporate benefit is recognized—derivative suit set-
tlements and common fund settlements of shareholder class actions—courts 
should conduct a more rigorous inquiry into the cause of the benefit.283 Courts 
                                                                                                                           
volving Activision and News Corp.). Mechanisms designed to ensure that these claims are not abused 
are articulated in Part IV B. and C. See supra notes 283–302 and accompanying text. 
 281 See Erickson, supra note 6, at 1754 (regarding the ability of governance cases to be brought as 
derivative suits). Even the recent bad banker cases, although pleaded as merger class actions, are more 
appropriately understood as derivative suits focusing on the board’s breach of fiduciary duty in agree-
ing to investment banking arrangements rife with conflict of interest. See, e.g., In re Rural Metro 
Corp. S’holders’ Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 110 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 
432, 442 (Del. Ch. 2012) (investment banker conflict of interest); In re Del Monte, 2011 WL 
2535256, at *1 (investment banker conflict of interest). Under current interpretations of the continu-
ous ownership requirement, the ability of shareholders to press these claims successfully as derivative 
suits is doubtful since the plaintiffs would surrender shares in the transaction and post-merger stand-
ing would pass to the acquirer. See infra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 282 398 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Ct. App. Tex. 2013). The relevant statute is Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 42(i)(2), which states: “If any portion of the benefits recovered for the class are in the form of 
coupons or other noncash common benefits,” attorneys’ fees must be awarded “in cash and noncash 
amounts in the same proportion as the recovery for the class.” Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i)(2)); see 
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer 
Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1070–98 (2001) (discussing the problem of collusive 
coupon-based settlements and suggesting reforms). 
 283 For an example of a court taking this responsibility seriously, see In re Citigroup S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 12-cv-03114-JPO (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) (denying $6 million fee request based 
on role of derivative suit in leading to ouster of Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit because “[s]hareholder 
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currently fail in their examinations of causation not for want of will, but as a 
result of jurisprudential standards that discourage real scrutiny.284 As a result, 
the only way to ensure genuine judicial scrutiny of causation is to adjust the 
relevant legal standard. 
Current law places the burden, in both corporate benefit and common 
fund settlements, on the party seeking to disprove the causal role of the litiga-
tion in the relief ultimately obtained by plaintiffs, effectively requiring defend-
ants or objectors to prove a negative—that the lawsuit “did not in any way 
contribute” to the ultimate relief.285 This rule is behind the proliferation of 
“tag-along” derivative suits settling for therapeutic changes that may in fact 
reflect the prior enforcement efforts of prosecutors or regulators.286 It also ex-
plains the ability of plaintiffs in controlling shareholder cases to receive credit 
for an increase in consideration actually produced by the efforts of the special 
negotiation committee.287 Likewise, it creates an opportunity for plaintiffs in 
merger litigation to claim credit for the appearance of a topping bid more plau-
sibly attributed to economic conditions or industry dynamics.288 Defendants 
are often complicit, if not downright collusive, in plaintiffs’ assertions, under-
standing that unless they allow plaintiffs’ attorneys’ to collect their fees, there 
will be no settlement and, therefore, no release of claims.289 Courts wishing to 
challenge causation are therefore on their own, facing a difficult standard, typ-
ically without an adversarial proceeding to develop the facts.290 
How then should the standard be changed? A starting point might be to 
distinguish cases in which plaintiffs win relief, whether in the form of thera-
peutic changes or additional merger consideration, on a “clear day” when there 
is no obviously related antecedent event, such as a regulatory action or a top-
ping bid. The current rule’s presumption in favor of plaintiffs’ causal role is 
appropriate in such cases because it operates to correct an information asym-
metry that otherwise would favor defendants. The defendants, after all, possess 
                                                                                                                           
pressure, not the lawsuits at issue in this action, was the cause of Citigroup’s policy changes”), aff’d 
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 284 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
 285 Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Brown, 988 A.2d 412, 414 (Del. 2010); see United Vanguard 
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 286 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text. 
 288 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 290 See e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 19, 49, In re TPC Grp. S’holders Litig., CA No. 7865-VCN, 
(Del. Ch. June 11, 2014) (mootness proceeding expressing unease with “a standard which defendants 
have no hope of ever meeting” and wondering further how defendants could ever “rebut every possi-
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all relevant information about what, in fact, triggered the relief. The plaintiffs 
do not. Placing the burden on the defendants therefore triggers the production 
of information in their exclusive possession. 
In cases involving clearly related antecedent events, such as a regulatory 
enforcement action or a topping bid, plaintiffs should be made to rebut the pre-
sumption that they did not cause the relevant change.291 This shift of the bur-
den and the standard in the context of antecedent events is appropriate because 
it is especially in this context that the lawyers on both sides are likely to be 
complicit, seeking to settle the case for reasons other than its underlying mer-
its—to close a deal or eliminate contingent liabilities in preparation for other 
corporate action. In such cases, the fundamental information asymmetry is not 
against plaintiffs in favor of defendants. Rather, it is against the court in favor 
of the litigants. Once the litigants have joined hands in settlement, they have 
every reason to obscure its origins and its effect—hence the “Kabuki dance” 
involved in controlling shareholder settlements.292 In such cases, unless the 
parties are forced to meet a standard requiring them to demonstrate that the 
relief is in fact a product of their efforts, courts cannot seriously examine the 
causal role of the litigation. 
Furthermore, shifting the burden and the standard in this context not only 
prevents plaintiffs’ counsel from receiving credit for something they most like-
ly did not cause, it also prevents duplicative litigation.293 For example, in cases 
where regulators or prosecutors extract corporate governance relief in the wake 
of a failure of corporate compliance, as indeed they often do, shareholder liti-
gation over the same events is fundamentally duplicative.294 The rule advocat-
ed here would discourage such “tag along” suits, making it much harder for 
attorneys to recover fees for bringing them. But it would not discourage suits 
where there had in fact been no related antecedent event, recognizing that in 
such cases the litigation is more likely to have produced the benefit. The policy 
result thus would not discourage shareholders from suing to enforce important 
                                                                                                                           
 291 As with the current rule, this presumption would be rebuttable. See DEL. R. EVID. 301(a) (stat-
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rights, it merely would discourage them from free-riding on the efforts of oth-
ers already doing so. 
C. Proportionality of the Litigation Release to the Benefit Received 
Third and finally, in order to combat the undercompensation problem in-
herent in providing defendants with extremely broad litigation releases in ex-
change for minimal compensation to plaintiffs, courts reviewing settlements 
should insist upon a relationship between the scope of the release and the mag-
nitude of the benefit. Current judicial practice in evaluating the fairness and 
adequacy of settlement only weighs the relief received against a rough assess-
ment of the merits of the underlying claim, not the value of the relief against 
the scope of the release.295 Moreover, judicial scrutiny of the release itself in-
vestigates only the relationship between the released claims and the factual 
basis of the settled case.296 Neither of these analytic rubrics sufficiently scruti-
nizes the settlement bargain. The best way to do that would be to require an 
express weighing of what actually is exchanged at settlement. Courts should 
balance the benefit received by plaintiffs against the scope of the release re-
ceived by the defendant. 
Several opinions of the Court of Chancery reveal receptivity to this ana-
lytic framework. Chancellor Allen, for example, suggested that it would be 
inappropriate to release claims that had never been asserted in a settlement that 
resulted in no consideration for the plaintiff class.297 More recently, in 2014 in 
the Delaware Court of Chancery case of In re Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. 
Shareholder Litigation, then-Chancellor Strine refused to approve a broad re-
lease given in a disclosure-only settlement, noting that “giving out releases 
lightly is something we’ve got to be careful about.”298 Vice Chancellor Laster 
did likewise in 2014 in the Delaware Court of Chancery case of Rubin v. Obagi 
Medical Products, Inc., a decision in which he expressly acknowledged the 
issues at stake: 
Delaware courts have often been quite deferential in recognizing 
that when parties bring significantly weak claims . . . they can be 
settled for weak consideration. The problem with that approach . . . 
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is that there are unknown unknowns in the world, and the type of 
global release the plaintiffs’ counsel gives in this case and routinely 
gives in return for disclosure settlements provides expansive protec-
tion for the defendants against a broad range of claims, virtually all 
of which have been completely unexplored by plaintiffs.299 
The Vice Chancellor went on to suggest that he would consider approving the 
settlement (and fees) if the release were made proportional to the relief 
achieved: “if people wanted to restructure the settlement so that it extended 
only to the claims actually brought in this litigation . . . then I think the scope 
of the release would be proportional to the relief that the plaintiffs actually ob-
tained.”300 Soon after Obagi, Vice Chancellor Laster revisited the same set of 
issues in In re Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litigation and again refused to 
approve a settlement offering a broad release when a number of potentially 
significant issues had not been explored by plaintiffs.301 
The principle suggested by these opinions is a rule of proportionality, bal-
ancing the relief received by plaintiffs against the release received by defend-
ants. In cases where plaintiffs receive insubstantial relief, the litigation release 
received by defendants should be correspondingly narrow. Thus, for example, 
disclosure-only relief should justify release only of state law disclosure claims, 
not federal securities claims and perhaps not even other fiduciary duty claims 
should a latent breach subsequently appear. Cases settling for significant pecu-
niary relief accordingly merit broader litigation releases. The Delaware Su-
preme Court’s 2008 decision in In re Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., for 
example, permitted a release seeking “complete peace” and releasing claims 
“to the broadest extent possible under law,” but only in the context of a settle-
ment that provided monetary relief of $99 million to the shareholder class.302 
A rule requiring proportionality between the relief and the release thus 
would prevent latent high value claims from being precluded by prior low val-
ue settlements, but still allowing litigants to receive significant releases for 
significant relief. Although this rule is designed to address the undercompensa-
tion problem inherent in the present system, it may have a broader effect. Re-
call that it is the prospect of receiving a release of any and all claims arising 
from the same underlying facts that brings defendants to the settlement table. 
Hence, if defendants can no longer receive such a broad release in exchange 
for a settlement that offers little value for the shareholder class, defendants 
may no longer settle nuisance claims. If defendants are no longer willing to 
                                                                                                                           
 299 Transcript at 8, C.A. No. 8433-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2014). 
 300 Id. at 9. 
 301 Transcript at 69, C.A. No. 8790-VCL (Del. Ch. May 5, 2014) (noting that “when a fiduciary 
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2015] Correcting Corporate Benefit 57 
settle, plaintiffs will be forced to fight, and plaintiffs forced to fight are much 
less likely to press claims that can only result in little or no relief. Instead, they 
will drop such cases or never file them in the first place. Excessive litigation, 
in other words, will substantially decline. 
No one defendant can have this effect on its own. Even if one defendant 
refuses to settle, the temptation to buy a broad release on the cheap will be too 
much for others to resist. Therefore, the availability of the broad, cheap release 
must be taken away from defendants as a class. Once the temptation is gone, 
defendants can credibly commit not to settle low value claims. And a credible 
commitment not to settle can go far towards discouraging such claims from 
being brought in the first place. 
D. How to Enact the Reforms 
Having articulated this package of reforms, it may be worth pausing a 
moment to reflect on how they might be implemented. In particular, could cor-
porations adopt the reforms themselves, through charter or bylaw amend-
ments? Or is legislative or judicial action required? 
With regard to the first question, there is clearly ample room in the pre-
vailing contract theory of bylaws to permit corporations to adopt a bylaw opt-
ing-out of corporate benefit.303 Indeed, if broad fee-shifting bylaws are valid 
under that theory, then clearly the more carefully aimed rule under considera-
tion here ought also to be valid. Moreover, should the courts eventually strike 
down fee-shifting bylaws, corporations still ought to be able to opt-out of cor-
porate benefit. Opting out of corporate benefit, unlike fee-shifting, does not 
deter shareholder claims by punishing class representatives or class counsel for 
bringing suit.304 Furthermore, shareholders would still have the full panoply of 
responses noted in the Delaware Court of Chancery 2013 case of Boilermakers 
Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp—they can vote and, more im-
portantly, they can sue, a remedy the current generation of fee-shifting bylaws 
denies them.305 Finally, a corporate benefit opt-out is more plausibly procedur-
al, regulating how shareholders may sue, not whether they can, than the current 
generation of fee-shifting bylaws.306 
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Assuming then that corporations could thus opt-out of corporate benefit 
by means of a board-sponsored bylaw, would they? Here, unfortunately, the 
analysis becomes more problematic. Even if it is in every corporation’s ex ante 
interest to fight frivolous shareholder suits, all corporations have a strong ex 
post incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases that such suits provide.307 It is, 
in other words, a collective action problem.308 Although corporations would on 
the whole prefer the rule advanced here, few may adopt it, anticipating the ex 
post incentive to defect. Hence, action on the part of the legislature or the judi-
ciary is likely necessary to enact the needed reforms to corporate benefit. 
Moreover, the second and third reforms, involving changes to the substantive 
legal standards employed by judges in reviewing the settlement of shareholder 
suits, are beyond the power of corporations themselves and therefore require 
legislative or judicial action. 
The optimal form of implementation thus would be an amendment to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law following the approach of the Texas legis-
lature in Kazman, but tailored to the corporate law context.309 The resulting 
change effectively would return Delaware to the American Rule on fees, a 
middle point between the harsh anti-shareholder consequences of the English 
Rule, on the one hand, and excessive generosity of the current Delaware Rule, 
on the other. Likewise, statutory amendments could be crafted to enact the 
second and third reforms advocated here—rules encouraging a more rigorous 
inquiry into the cause of the benefit and requiring strict proportionality be-
tween the relief and the release. 
It is worth noting, however, that the latter two rules, focusing on the sub-
ject and scope of judicial action at settlement, could also be implemented di-
rectly by courts. Indeed, the Court of Chancery has demonstrated a willingness 
to experiment on these points that ought to be encouraged.310 Judicial action 
could also bring Delaware back to the American Rule on fees. This, however, 
would require the Supreme Court to confront the Delaware Supreme Court 
1989 decision in Tandycrafts Inc. v. Initio Partners and overrule, or at least 
qualify, longstanding judicial practice arising from that opinion. 
Still, there is no time like the present. Delaware is in the midst of an his-
toric re-evaluation of the current system of shareholder litigation and every-
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thing ought therefore to be on the table.311 With regard to the package of re-
forms offered here, it does not matter whether the legislature or the judiciary 
takes the lead. Moreover, although most effective as a package, each of the 
reforms articulated in this Article is fully severable and could be implemented 
separately from the others. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has urged policy-makers to take advantage of the controversy 
surrounding fee-shifting bylaws to solve the deeper problems giving rise to the 
current crisis in shareholder litigation. The present system of shareholder liti-
gation results in overcompensation of attorneys, undercompensation of the 
plaintiff class, and ineffective deterrence. Reform is therefore needed, but not 
in the form of fee-shifting bylaws, which overreach and penalize good and bad 
claims alike. 
The way to attack a crisis is by going after its cause, not merely its ef-
fects. Having reviewed patterns and practices in shareholder litigation, this Ar-
ticle has identified the cause of the crisis as misinterpretation and misapplica-
tion of the corporate benefit doctrine. It has therefore articulated three narrow-
ly tailored reforms to correct corporate benefit and, in doing so, fix shareholder 
litigation. These include: no longer awarding attorneys’ fees for recoveries of 
non-pecuniary relief in shareholder class actions, shifting the burden for estab-
lishing causation in certain settlement contexts, and insisting that the scope of 
the defendant’s litigation release be proportional to the relief received by the 
plaintiffs’ class. Delaware’s ongoing review and examination into shareholder 
litigation provides an ideal opportunity to enact these reforms. 
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